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1 Introduction
1.1 Abstract
Since many years, firewalls are used to protect internal networks of government offices, compa-
nies and other institutions against potential attackers from the Internet. In most cases the firewall
acts as a central hub for all connections from and to the outer world. Therefore it is located at
the ultimatest part of the internal network - open for all kinds of attacks. Security, functionality,
assurance of proper operation and performance are the primary aims to achieve by operating a
firewall system.
In the last years, the fast and dynamic open source movement and the intimately connected open
source software products became a remarkable alternative to often slow developed and lethal
closed source products. But it holds a lot of alternative products often strongly related to different
open source operating systems like BSD or Linux. If an administrator has to make a decision
without proper previous knowledge, it is very hard for him, to find the best opportunity to solve
the problem. Some of this very important strategic decisions are even taken by a good feel of the
person in charge.
The fact that there is no real objective and comparative paper available about open source based
firewalls led to this effort. Indeed, there are some papers of the BSI (Firewall Studie 1997/2001).
Unfortunatly, these papers are mostly obsolete (older than three years) and examine only closed
source and very expensive firewall systems.
1.2 Description of general aims
This study compares the major open source firewall systems and some commercial systems in
several aspects to make it possible that someone can choose the best system for his special pur-
pose. You can find the appropriate products in section 3.7 on page 95. All these systems should
cover todays highest security standards. Of course nobody can prevent incompetent administra-
tion resulting in a dangerous or erroneous state of the firewall. This study is also not to be seen
as a firewall howto. Instead this effort is intended to analyse the quality in terms of performance,
security, documentation and usability.
1.3 Structure and Design
This document is divided into several chapters. Chapter 1 (page 5) gives a general introduction
and definitions for all used scientific terms. It also offers an overview about the current deployed
firewall structures and several well known attacks against firewalls. We give a list of requirements
for a good firewall system in the following chapter 2 (page 23). The study is based on this require-
ments. The complete testing environment is comprehensively described in section 3 (page 34).
Section 4 (page 96) lists and describes each test used to evaluate the systems. The particular test
results for each firewall system can be found in Attachment A.1. Finally, a conclusion is drawn in
section 5 (page 143).
Attachment A.2 contains the source code of all used programs (e.g. for evaluation of their correct-
ness and reproduceability of the whole study).
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1.4 State of art
1.4.1 What is a firewall?
1.4.1.1 Introduction to firewalls
Imagine you would have to administer the network of a company. It should be used for sending
emails and storing business data centrally. The company plans also to provide access to the world
wide web andmany other patterns of utilisation. Therefore the private network will be connected
to the Internet over an access point. These kind of nodes are called router or gateway. The disad-
vantage of this transition is the possible misuse or malicious utilisation from the internal network
or the Internet. Attackers are able to access services offered by the company or lead offences from
computers inside the network against the Internet. In most cases the subnet is business crucial for
the company and a malfunction of the network can become extremely expensive. On the other
hand the company will be accountable if an attack will be lead from inside the network. Therefore
it must be possible to control and limit the use of the transition between the private network and
the Internet.
This task is mostly done by a firewall.
A firewall is both, organizational and technical concept for the separation of network domains.
A correct realisation of the concept and a durable care of the firewall guarantee the best possible
safety of the private network. The concept itself has to be determined by a collection of policies
for the entire company.
In practice a firewall is a piece of hardware, which connects two network domains in exactly the
way, as it is approved in the concept. This piece of hardware is called firewall system, shortened
as firewall.
A so calledAppliance is a firewall which includesmany features, likeDHCP1 server,DNS2 server,
IDS3 and virus scanner.
Figure 1: Firewall as node to the public internet
1DHCP - Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
2DNS - Domain Name System
3IDS - Intrusion Detection System
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1.4.1.2 Packet filters
Today, company networks and the Internet are mainly based on TCP4 and UDP5 over IP6. Every
computer in the Internet has an IP address. Every service, that is carried out on a computer and
should be accesible via the network binds itself on a defined port. Therefore IP addresses and the
port numbers are used for addressing. Data is transferred by packets including the IP address
and port for source and destination.
A firewall can examine those packets for their origin and destination. By means of a specific set
of rules, it has to make a decision whether the packet may pass the firewall or if something else
should be done with it. This component of the firewall is called packet filter or packet screen.
The set of rules for the packet filter is derived from a policy. There are two basic strategies for a
special security policy. The first strategy will block every packet that is not affected by a specific
rule. It is sometimes also called default deny strategy. The second strategy, the default allow
strategy, will pass every packet that is not affected by a specific rule. In most cases it is better to
dissuade from the default allow strategy, which leads mostly to less security.
A packet filter can examine the header of the network layer (IP) and the header of the transport
layer (TCP/UDP) of a packet according to source and destination information. It checks system-
atically the packets against the set of rules. The finally selected rule, which applies to the packet,
is taken and the action, that is specified, is performed. If no rule applies, the default strategy is
performed.
A packet filter is completely transparent for the user.
1.4.1.3 Proxies
It is also important to examine the packets, passing the firewall, for defective content to avoid
misuse or to filter for viruses in emails.
Like a packet filter, a proxy is switched between sender and receiver. The difference is, that a
proxy is not transparent for the user. The sender must adjust explicitly the proxy. Direct access
of the client to the server has to be suppressed by blocking ports in the packet filter or disabling
routing completely. In the second case the proxy is also called dual-homed gateway. You can
achieve a complete separation of the network domains on application level. The only transition
point between the two networks is the proxy. Therefore the user is forced to use the proxy.
A proxy typically owns a set of rules configured according to the requirements. This set of rules
is called ACL7. In the case of a HTTP8 proxy it is possible to adjust which URL9’s are accessible
and which ones not.
A request to an external service is checked against the set of rules. If the request does not conflict
with a rule, it is carried out as a new request by the proxy itself. The received answer is also
checked against the set of rules and if it also meets the rules, is sent as a new answer to the client.
Thereby the structure of the internal network is not revealed and the user remains anonymous to
a certain extent.
A proxy works, unlike the packet filter, on the application layer. That means, the control of the
communication relationships occur on application level. A proxy can also buffer content to de-
crease traffic and to lower the load on the target server. A further feature of a proxy is the possi-
bility, to construct a more detailed log (audit) than a packet filter is able to. It is also possible to
restrict access to a service in the way that only authorized users can access to it.
4TCP - Transmission Control Protocol
5UDP - User Datagram Protocol
6IP - Internet Protocol
7ACL - Access Control List
8HTTP - Hypertext Transfer Protocol
9URL - Uniform Resource Locator
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Proxies can be divided into two classes: circuit level gateways, described in section 1.4.1.3 on page
8, and application level gateways, described in section 1.4.1.3 on page 8.
Circuit level gateways
Circuit level gateways act independent of the protocol. As a result, the possibility to control the
content of the packets depending on the application layer is lost, but the possibility of user authen-
tication and buffering persist. The content can nevertheless be checked for protocol independent
data patterns like virus signatures. There are circuit level gateways available for TCP and UDP.
An implementation of a circuit level gateway can be found in Socksv4 and Socksv5 servers.
Application level gateways
An application level gateway examines the content of the packets related to the application pro-
tocol. Accordingly, you need an own proxy server for each level 7 protocol. There are application
level gateways at least for HTTP, POP310, SMTP11, FTP12, LDAP13, Lotus Notes, MS-SQL14,
NNTP15, RealAudio Protocol, rlogin16, SSL17 and Telnet.
1.4.1.4 Screened gateways
A combination of a packet filter and a proxy is called a screened gateway.
Figure 2: Screened gateway
It is common practice that there is solely access to specific services only over the proxy. All packets
of other services are transmitted by the packet filter.
1.4.2 Whose job rests on firewalls?
Running a firewall involves the employment of various people. That is because of the fact that a
firewall is business crucial for a company. A malfunction of the firewall is to be avoided under all
circumstances. In order to prevent technical failure, a control through the staff is necessary.
10POP3 - Post Office Protocol version 3
11SMTP - Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
12FTP - File Transfer Protocol
13LDAP - Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
14MS-SQL - Microsoft Structured Query Language
15NNTP - Network News Transfer Protocol
16rlogin - Remote Login
17SSL - Secure Socket Layer
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• Firewall installer: The firewall installer is responsible for setting-up the firewall. He incor-
porates the firewall into the available infrastructure and configures the available rules of the
security policy.
• Firewall maintainer: The firewall maintainer is responsible for the service reliability of the
firewall. He hast to make sure, that security holes of the operating system or the firewall
itself become fixed immediately or as soon as patches are available for the problem. He
is responsible for a up-to-date installation of current virus signatures and known attack
signatures to any time.
• Firewall reviser: The role of a reviser can be divided into the external and the internal re-
viser. The external reviser leads purposeful attacks against the firewall in order to find out,
whether there are security holes. He must obtain an explicit permission from the manage-
ment, otherwise he makes himself punishable. The internal reviser is responsible for the
correct realisation of policies and its coverage to the management. His task is only to con-
trol other people working on the firewall. He has to check the ruleset, the logs and any
change that is done on the firewall system or the infrastructure.
• Policy developer: The policy developer creates rules conforming to the policies, especially
the security policy. These rules define whether a packet is allowed, dropped, rejected,
logged or any other action that can be performed.
List 1: Jobs around the firewall
A lot of small companies are forced to fill all these jobs by one employee. This role is mostly
designated as firewall admin, firewall expert or IT security manager.
1.4.3 Strategies of firewalls
Asmentioned above, a single use of a packet filter or a proxy is not recommended, because neither
of them is a cure-all. Rather, you try to use a multistage application of packet filters and proxies
to achieve a higher safety level, as a single device can.
1.4.3.1 Central firewall with packet filter and application proxy
The simplest and cheapest variant is the installation of a central firewall. Because of simplicity
however, you should only use this construction for experimental networks, home use or firms,
that do not offer any services.
Figure 3: Central firewall
A central firewall establishes the only interface between the private network and the remaining
Internet. In this case a firewall system should consist of one packet filter and various proxies.
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There is a homogeneous safety level within the entire private network. A further differentiation
depending on security levels does not occur. A control of the internal connections by the firewall
is not possible. The central firewall presupposes a defined safety policy for the entire internal
network. Deviating safety policies for especially sensitive areas are not achievable on network
layer. There is the necessity of a central user management system because the allowed communi-
cation must be defined for user. You have to define which services and which IP adresses a user
is allowed to contact.
Since a central firewall does not support a differentiation between different subnets and accord-
ingly presupposes a homogeneous safety level for the entire subnet, the level of guaranteed pro-
tection is set according to themost sensitive data. This level of protection is accordingly very high.
Further, it has the disadvantage to set an unnecessary high level of protection for computers with
lesser sensitive data. Now the danger exists, that the users of these computers create additional
Internet entrances from their computers (for example through private modem uplinks), which
have smaller restrictions. Thereby, the entire purpose of the firewall is senseless. Central firewalls
have a further disadvantage, also known from mainframe computing, namely the problem that
a user management system, that occurs far from respective department, leads often to deviations
between the reality of user rights and its mapping to the accounts. Since a purely central fire-
wall solution does not control connections within the internal network, the danger exists, that
the entire private network is considered as a unit and as a result only the outgoing or incoming
connections are restricted.
The application of an only central firewall is at most passable, when all connected subnets have
the same security demand and/or level and the danger of intern abuse does not exist. For exam-
ple this is the case in the private field. However in a large company with several branch offices
and a large number of connected computers you can not assume this.
1.4.3.2 Demilitarised area
Figure 4: Firewall with demilitarised zone
In the variant with the so-called demilitarised zone, two firewalls are put in succession. As a
result, the internal subnet is divided up into two zones with different safety level. Between the
two firewalls exists the so-called demilitarised zone. In most cases it has a smaller safety level
as behind the inner firewall. Servers, which provide services available for Internet users (for
example web servers or mail servers), are often placed in the demilitarised zone (DMZ, also called
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screened subnet). The internal network, which includes the computers of the employees, is cut
off by a further Firewall. This has the advantage, that the local area network is protected, too.
Even if an attacker broke into a server placed in the DMZ. If different firewall solutions made
by different manufacturers are used for the internal and the external firewall a higher safety can
be achieved because possible malfunctions during independent evolution of the products do not
occur simultaneously in both products.
The tasks of the two firewalls can be undertaken by only one firewall with several interfaces, too.
With the several network interfaces you can form subnets with different safety. In such a way,
one or more demilitarised zones can be arranged. This solution is more economical, however
it lowers the high safety, because of possible bugs in the single device. You can spot additional
proxy servers in the demilitarised zone or place them in the internal network.
1.4.4 Features of firewalls
This section deals with features of firewalls which are often listed in advertisings of firewalls.
1.4.4.1 Stateful inspection
It is a disadvantage of a packet filter if it is not able to assign packets to an existing connection.
In such a case each packet is seen stateless. A firewall with stateful inspection considers the
status of a connection in addition to the standard packet filter options and deposits all current
connections in a dynamic table. In such a way the current state of a connection is observed. The
stateful inspection firewall collects the necessary information from the flags of TCP packets. As a
result, the firewall can block packets which can not be assigned to an established connection. The
dynamic connection table represents the core of this firewall. All initiated connections are stored
there with IP addresses of source and destination and the assigned ports. Since the respective
status of a connection is checked, the unauthorized intrusion into the internal network is hardly
possible.
1.4.4.2 Deep inspection
A simple packet filter is not able to examine packets in context. However, you can imagine your-
self easily, that only a certain combination of packets have a defective effect. For this purpose,
there is a quite new technique called deep inspection. A packet filter with deep inspection can
examine a sequence of packets and can control the sequence with the use of an attack signa-
ture whether it causes damage or not. Therefore, a packet filter with deep inspection inspects,
similarly to a proxy, the payload part of the packets. In this case, deep inspection is however
considerably faster than a proxy. The attack signatures can be received within the framework of
a service contract from the manufacture of the firewall.
1.4.4.3 Routing
Since a firewall is the transition point between two networks, it can undertake the router func-
tionality too. Accordingly, the router functionality is installed in every hardware firewall. Next
to static routing there are often OSPF18, RIPv119, RIPv220, source based routing, BGP21, IGMP22
and DVMRP23 implemented.
18OSPF - Open Shortest Path First
19RIPv1 - Routing Information Protocol version 1
20RIPv2 - Routing Information Protocol version 2
21BGP - Border Gateway Protocol
22IGMP - Internet Group Management Protocol
23DVMRP - Distanmce Vector Multicast Routing Protocol
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1.4.4.4 Network address translation
In the case of NAT24 the IP addresses of a private network are assigned to publicly registered IP
addresses via a translation table. A private IP address and a public IP address is assigned to each
computer in the private subnet. The public IP address is only known by the router. That has the
advantage that computers which communicate with each other within the private network, must
not have a public IP address. Each computer in the subnet gets a table entry in the router. When a
computer in the private subnet wants to communicate with a computer in the Internet, the router
replaces the private source address by the public address of the source computer (so called SNAT).
When the answer returns, the router replaces the destination address with the private address (so
called DNAT). Through this one-to-one assignment, these computers are not only able to set up
a connection to destinations in the Internet; they are also accessible from the Internet without
having a public IP address. The internal structure of the private network remains hidden for
computers in the Internet.
Figure 5: Scenario with NAT
1.4.4.5 Port address translation (IP masquerading)
Public IP addresses cost a lot of money because the allocation of them to the networks proceeded
very wastefully in the past and today no more large IP address fields are free. If you have many
computers and you can not get a public IP address for each computer, you can assign a private IP
address to each computer in the private subnet. Only the router requires an IP address belonging
to the public network. The router replaces the IP address and the sender port of the outgoing
packets of the sending station with its own IP address of the superior network and a free port.
Since the incoming packets must be assigned to the correct destination, the router stores the cur-
rent port translation combinations in a symbol table. Incoming requests can not, as in the case
of NAT, be assigned to the correct computer, because no entry is available in the symbol table.
An entry is only generated if a computer in the private network sets up a request to the public
network. This can be an advantage, but it can also be a disadvantage because all internal services
are not offered to the public network. However, there is the possibility to generate a static entry
in the symbol table (so called port forwarding or redirect). For example, you can adjust that all
requests, which reach the router on port 80 are forwarded to a computer in the private network.
However, a full access to all ports of all computers in the private subnet is not possible.
24NAT - Network Address Translation
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Figure 6: Scenario with PAT
The assignment of port numbers to internal IP addresses occurs dynamically. A new free port
is assigned to every new connection from the inside outwards. The number of simultaneous
connections is accordingly limited by the number of ports on the router and the size of the symbol
table.
1.4.4.6 VPN (Virtual Private Network)
If an employee would like to access the company’s network from his home, the company would
require modem dial-in stations, so that the employee can dial-in with his modem getting direct
access to the company’s network. This is usually very expensive and it would be better, if the em-
ployee uses quite normal the uplink to his provider and then connects via the public Internet to
the company’s network. The computer of the employee gets a dynamic IP address the provider
assigned him. This IP address does not match the IP address space of the company’s subnet.
Thus, you can never be sure that it is really the employee, which connects to the company’s net-
work or if it is another one. Attackers can monitor the communication between the employee
and the company’s network or they can slip in the role of the employee. Therefore, the company
requires a possibility to encrypt data traffic and they need a mechanism, with which they can
prove the employee, whether he is the one he poses himself. For this purpose, there are VPN25’s.
In the case of a VPN, an encrypted channel is built up by the computer of the employee via the
insecure public network to the company’s network. Typical hardware firewalls support encryp-
tion algorithms like DES26, 3DES27 and AES28. MD529 and SHA-130 are in most cases used for
the authentication of the clients to theVPN server. Most firewalls have an integratedVPN server.
The path marked red is the VPN channel. The communication is only encrypted on this path and
not in the company’s network. The computer of the employee gets still an IP address from the
provider. In the VPN channel, IP in IP packets are built. That means that a further IP packet is
inserted into the IP packet, which is stamped with the IP address of the provider. The internal
25VPN - Virtual Private Network
26DES - Data Encryption Standard
273DES - Triple Data Encryption Standard
28AES - Advanced Encryption Standard
29MD5 - Message Digest version 5
30SHA-1 - Secure Hash Algorithm
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Figure 7: Scenario with VPN
packet is stamped with an IP address of the company’s network. As a result, the employee’s
computer has an unchangeable IP address of the company’s subnet.
1.4.4.7 Intrusion prevention and detection
An intrusion detection system is able to recognise and sometimes to block attacks in the private
network. For this purpose, it observes network traffic and the filesystem of one or more comput-
ers via specific host software. The intrusion detection system scans these computers permanently
and alerts the administrator, if security vulnerabilities have been detected. The intrusion detec-
tion system is thereby not only able to detect attacks in the network traffic. It also recognises,
if a hacker penetrates a target computer. If an attack is detected it logs the attack and informs
a responsible person. Additionally it can reset the connection (TCP RST) or it can configure a
firewall to block the traffic of the attacking computer. Many manufactures offer intrusion detec-
tion systems as a standalone device. However, firewall manufactures integrate some parts of the
intrusion detection system also into their products. With this function, firewalls are able to detect
attack patterns of hacker programs and block them before they damage something. Attacks like
SYN flood attacks, ICMP flood attacks, UDP smurf attacks, Ping of deaths, IP spoofing attacks,
port scans, land attacks, tear drop attacks and WinNuke attacks can be recognised and blocked.
These attacks are described in a later chapter.
1.4.4.8 User authentication
There should also be a possibility, that a user authenticates itself towards the firewall. Finally, not
everyone should be allowed to use the entrance to the Internet. As already mentioned, a proxy
server can lock or unlock the entrance for individual users. However, the proxy server must know
for this reason who is allowed to access. The VPN server must also know whether a specific
person may build up a VPN channel to the company’s network or not. For this reason some
firewalls offer the possibility to store user data locally or they are able to connect to a directory
service like LDAP, Radius or Microsoft Active Directory.
1.4.4.9 IP address aliasing
Usually, one IP address is assigned to every interface (network card etc.) of a computer. A com-
puter with one interface usually has precisely one IP address. Routers with several interfaces,
have correspondingly several IP addresses, just one for every interface. However, this is not ur-
gent. Modern implementations allow the assignment of several IP addresses to one interface, so
called “IP aliasing”. This is used, if a server with one network interface should provide different
services on different IP addresses. A different IP address is then assigned to each service. Thereby,
the service becomes computer-independent. If another computer should offer the service, the IP
address can simply be taken over to the interface of the new computer. In this way, the relocation
Torsten Ho¨fler, Christian Burkert, Martin Telzer Page 14/157
Comparative firewall study Chemnitz, 1st October 2004
is not visible for the clients. With IP aliasing, firewalls can provide access to the public network
for several private subnets with only one internal interface and without further internal routers.
1.4.4.10 Time based filters
Sometimes it is useful to define a different system of rules for different points of time. That would
be reasonable, for example, if you would like to forbid the usage of services during working time.
Nevertheless, you want to provide the possibility to use the services of the Internet after working
time. For this purpose, there is the possibility to arrange a time-controlled system of rules. This
time based system of rules, is called time based filters. Attention, some manufactures of firewalls
also mean the analysis of logging information concerning time when they speak of time based
filters.
1.4.4.11 Embedded antivirus
Viruses scatter themselves very fast in the Internet. To avoid the infection of the private subnet, a
lot of firewalls offer the possibility to scan the traffic for known virus signatures. If there is a virus
in an email, the corresponding packets are dropped. In many cases, there are virus scanners for
POP3/IMAP31, SMTP andHTML included.
1.4.4.12 URL filter
An URL filter is usually integrated in a HTTP proxy. He decides whether a specific URLmay be
called or not. This allows a comprehensive protection of unwanted and/or forbidden contents.
1.4.4.13 Logging, monitoring and alarm notification
A further splendid functionality of a firewall is the monitoring and the logging feature. You can
record all traffic, passing the firewall. Later you can take a look, what possibly has gonewrong. At
the first look, it appears wise to record an identified attack, in order to trace later who the attacker
was. It is also possible to control what a specific employee is doing in the Internet. Furthermore,
the administrator can be warned in critical situations by SNMP32 trap, pager, email or sms for
example. Via monitoring software he can look at specific traffic. For this purpose, the software
owns mostly various filters to examine the extensive log according to content, type, date and
other aspects.
1.4.4.14 Remote management
For an administrator it is always favourable if he can maintain a device from the distance. For
this purpose commercially available firewalls offer various interfaces in order to administer the
firewall. Because of the safety explosiveness of the firewall, you should attend to access the man-
agement interface over a secure channel. Many firewalls offer therefore HTTPS33, SSH34 or SN-
MPv335. However, many firewalls also offer access via insecure HTTP or telnet. If you depend
onto these insecure entrances, you should only make them accessible via a specific management
network, which is separated from the normal company network.
1.4.4.15 Stealth mode
Stealth mode is a term that is understood differently by nearly every manufacturer. Stealth mode
can stand for the ability to identify and defeat port scan attacks. Other manufacturers associate a
31IMAP - Internet Message Access Protocol
32SNMP - Simple Network Management Protocol
33HTTPS - Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol
34SSH - Secure Shell
35SNMPv3 - Simple Network Management Protocol version 3
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VPN channel with the term stealth mode. Next time routers that do not decrease the TTL36 of the
IP packet, are termed as devices in stealth mode. Others call a firewall running in stealth mode,
if it has no own IP and all data traffic is received and analysed in promiscous mode.
1.4.4.16 DNS server
Some firewalls own an integrated DNS server. This DNS server is mostly configured in the way,
that it answers name server queries for the private net and forwards all other name server queries
to the DNS server of the provider. However, this is not a decisive feature for the functionality of
the firewall.
1.4.4.17 IP address assignment
The ability of a firewall to answer DHCP/ BOOTP37 requests is called IP address assignment.
As a result, the network interfaces of the computers in the private subnet can be configured auto-
matically. Additionally, the firewall can be used asDHCP Relay. That means thatDHCP requests
are forwarded to a DHCP server, which is not present in the private subnet. That is the case, for
example, in companies which own several computer centres, which are connected via a public
link, but own only one central DHCP server.
1.4.4.18 High availability
A failure of a firewall usually means an enormous financial deficit for a company which depends
on the communication with the public network. In the case of an emergency, the risk to become
a victim of an attack increases enormous because the firewall is operated in a way, where it does
not protect the private network correctly. The MTTR38 should be as small as possible. A lot of
manufactures of firewalls offer, for this purpose, a feature called high availability. High availabil-
ity is obtained by a peer-to-peer architecture with several firewalls. One firewall is working and
another one waits standby and checks the state of the first firewall. Both firewalls synchronise
their configuration among each other. Therefore, the system of rules and the settings are identi-
cal on both firewalls at any time. If an error occurs on the acting firewall, the second becomes
active, undertakes the service and informs the administrator. Manual intervention in the case of
an emergency is unnecessary. You receive a redundant solution and lower the probability of a
complete loss.
1.4.4.19 PKI support
A PKI39 offers a trustworthy and secure execution of authentication, guarantees communication
integrity and offers non-repudiation of transactions in an online environment. PKI can be used
to manage digital ID’s of routers, firewalls, VPN gateways, VPN clients and even personnel ID’s,
which are stored on smartcards. PKI is based on the use of public key encryption. Public key
encryption means, that messages are decrypted and encrypted with different keys. Each par-
ticipating unit (person or device) in the PKI has two keys, one public key and one private key.
Private keys are secret and only known by the owner. Public keys are public as the name already
says and can be published, for example in a directory server or a web server, accessible to anyone.
The two keys are mathematically dependent but the private key can not be reconstructed with
the help of the public key. Before public key operations can be carried out, the public key must
be sent secure to the other party, so that nobody can exchange the unique key with another one.
If the number of the users increases and the users do not know themselves among each other, the
36TTL - Time To Live
37BOOTP - Bootstrap Protocol
38MTTR - Mean Time To Repair
39PKI - Public Key Infrastructure
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Figure 8: Scenario with high availability
administration of free usable keys becomes fast impossible. PKI offers a solution for this prob-
lem, because it uses a third party provider in order to guarantee confidence and in order to offer
certificates for the transferred keys. A firewall with PKI support can be integrated offhand into
a PKI by revealing its keys and therefore the firewall can verify the integrity of the key of the
communication partners.
1.4.4.20 Traffic management (load balancing/QOS)
Traffic management is divided into the distribution of requests (load balancing), for example to
prevent the overload of a firewall and to guarantee bandwidth and response times for specific
selected services (QOS40).
For avoidance of overloads of a single firewall, there are devices, which check the load on every
firewall in the company. In the case of overload, this device balances the in- and outgoing data
traffic equable between several services, considering their capability. User requests can be guided,
by use of a definable policy, to specific, preconfigured firewalls. The result is an efficient assign-
ment of resources. One device canmanage the load balancing for several firewalls. Therefore, you
can install a firewall farm without configuring different client groups with different QOS settings
in the network. Some firewall systems have this feature integrated. Thus it is possible to load
balance the traffic to several firewalls with one logical firewall system.
For the guarantee of bandwidth and response times, most firewalls have a traffic management
software. The administrator can divide data traffic into different priority classes with this soft-
ware. He can define guaranteed bandwidths and individual priority rules for specific information
or individual users in realtime. As a result, the system guarantees a smooth flow of important
data.
1.4.4.21 Demilitarised zone support
With this feature the firewall is able to make one or more demilitarised zones available, as de-
scribed in the section 1.4.3.2. Therefore the device is equipped with several interfaces so that you
can connect the demilitarised zone(s) with the inner zone.
40QOS - Quality of Service
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Figure 9: Scenario with load balancer
1.4.4.22 Hardened operating system
Each firewall solution needs an operating system on which it can run, regardless whether it is a
hardware firewall or a software firewall. Today, these are operating systems which are based on
UNIX or the firewall uses a complete proprietary development of the manufacturer (for expam-
ple IOS41 of Cisco). It is of course cheaper, if you use a prefabricated operating system and adapt
it to your requirements. The adaptation is urgently necessary. A firewall requires less functions
than a complete operating system. An operating system contains, because of high functionality,
considerably more bugs than a proprietary development. An attacker can use these bugs to at-
tack the private network. The manufactures of firewall systems must slim the operating system.
Such a slimmed operating system is called hardened operating system. The operating system
is modified so that it has a purely monolithic core, which only contains the minimum of device
support required by the firewall. Module support is deactivated. As a result, manipulations of
the running operating system itself, in the case of a successful intrusion in the firewall, are com-
plicated strongly. The execution of code which lies in the stack is suppressed, too, so that buffer
overflows can be exploited no more. The network layer is separated from the system layer, so that
an intrusion into the operating system is made impossible.
1.5 Typical attacks concerning firewalls
In many advertisements of firewalls you can read, that the firewall protects you from several
attacks. This chapter should explain themost common attacks which can be identified and fended
by a firewall. This is not a complete list of attacks.
41IOS - Internet Operating System
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1.5.1 Attacks against the TCP/IP stack
Attacks against the TCP/IP stack use bugs in the processing of TCP/IP headers.
1.5.1.1 Ack storms
If an attacker infiltrates packets into a running communication (for example with TCP Hijacking),
the communication becomes desynchronised because the sequence numbers are used twice. As
a result they are not increased correctly. One of the two communication partners notices that
there is something wrong and sends an ACK packet to the other one in order to synchronise
the communication again. The sequence number of this ACK packet is also wrong, so that the
partner also sends an ACK packet. This can happen infinitly until the network collapses because
of overload.
1.5.1.2 Land attacks
When a TCP packet with enabled SYN flag, identical source- and destination IP address and
identical source and target port is sent, it can happen that the destination computer freezes. Some
versions of Solaris, Windows NT, BSD and some routers are vulnerable.
1.5.1.3 SYN flood attacks
Goal of a SYN flood attack is the filling of the SYN queue in the operating system core of the
destination computer, so that no further SYN requests can be accepted. The easiest way to do this
is to send the first part of the “three-way handshake”. The victim sends the second part and waits
while the attacker does nothing. The destination computer stores special values representing the
semi-open combinations in the SYN queue. If the queue is full, no new combinations can be
handled. The server is then blocked. You can protect yourself by the use of SYN cookies. SYN
cookies are activated if the SYN queue is full. The SYN cookie swaps out the information for the
connection onto the TCP packets itself instead of holding them in the SYN queue.
1.5.1.4 Smurf attack
If you send a ping to a broadcast address, every system in the affected subnet has to answer
according to the specificationswith an ICMP echo reply. According to the size of the address space
and the number of answering computers a considerable number of responses can be generated.
The trick insists on spoofing the source address so that the victim receives the replies. If you send
1 000 packets per second, and 1000 computers which received the packets send repliest, then the
victim gets 1 000 000 packets per second. These replies create a very high quantity of data so that
the computer of the victim collapses under the enormous traffic. Generally you can misuse each
protocol, which answers a broadcast with a reply to the source.
1.5.1.5 UDP smurf attack
This attack is very similar to the smurf attack. Indeed, the attacker sends UDP packets instead of
ICMP packets.
1.5.1.6 ICMP flood attack
This attack is very similar to the smurf attack, too. However, the ICMP packets are sent directly to
the victim here. The objective is to lower the bandwidth of the Internet connection of the victim.
A precondition is that the attacker has more bandwidth than the victim.
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1.5.1.7 Oversized fragmentation attack (ping of death)
An IP packet can be up to 64 kilobytes large. In order to transmit it, however via Ethernet it must
be separated into fragments which have typically a maximum size of 1 500 bytes. On the basis of
the fragment offset the packet is put together then again on the receiving end. It is now possible,
that the last fragment has an offset that makes together with the fragment size more than 65 535
bytes (64 kilobytes). While putting together the fragments an oversized packet is generated. This
oversized packet produces a buffer overflow on the receivers computer. This attack is mentioned
also as ping of death because the ping instruction is preferred for this purpose.
1.5.1.8 Tiny fragment attack
A tiny fragment attack consists of using very small fragments. The heads of TCP and possible
other protocols do not fit completely in the first fragment. Some packet filters analyse only the
first fragment and let possibly pass illegal IP datagrams.
1.5.1.9 Overlapping fragment attack
An overlapping fragment attack is an attack that exploits IP fragmentation. It is also called
teardrop. The present Internet Protocol specification RFC 791 describes a re-assembling-algorithm
that produces new fragments and overwrites in this case every overlapping part of the before
received fragments. If you use such an algorithm, the attacker can construct a chain of pack-
ets, where the first fragment (with an offset of length zero) includes harmless data. Thereby, it
is routed by the packet filter. An arbitrary following packet with an offset that is greater than
zero might overlap the TCP header information (for example destination port). This information
would be modified by the algorithm (overwritten). This second packet is not filtered by some
packet filters. Countermeasure to that is to use packet filters which require a minimum of frag-
ment offset for fragments. Only few newer TCP/IP stacks recognise this problem and correct
it.
1.5.2 Hijacking
The objective of hijacking is the infiltration and/or the take over of a foreign connection or a
foreign service.
1.5.2.1 ARP spoofing
ARP Spoofing is hijacking on layer 2. It is used to receive the traffic which a computer (sender)
sends to another one (victim). An attacker sends forged ARP packets to the sender. He uses his
MAC address and the IP address of the computer which is to be attacked in an ARP response.
The sender inserts the combination of MAC address and IP address from the ARP response into
his ARP cache and sends now all packets which are intended for the attacked computer to the
attacker because he inserts the MAC address of the attacker in each packet which is meant for the
victim. This works only if attacker, victim and sender are in the same subnet. The attacker can
simulate a foreign identity or he can hide the own identity. With this procedure you can redirect
the net traffic of other machines also in a switched network onto the machine of the attacker and
observe and manipulate the network traffic.
1.5.2.2 TCP hijacking (Session hijacking)
Under TCP-hijacking you can imagine a takeover of the connection on layer 3 and 4. You can
achieve this by simply continuing the connection if one of both communication partners finishes
the connection. You can also take over the connection right in the communication and displace the
original communication partner. TCP hijacking is also characterised by smuggling instructions
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into the running communication. An attacker observes the traffic and then he can smuggle in
packets with the correct sequence number. Since the original communication partners do not
know that the misused sequence numbers are expired, the communication relationship becomes
desynchronised.
1.5.2.3 Service hijacking
An attacker can try to take over a service by service hijacking. Therefore, it is also called hijacking
on layer 5. A service can be taken over, when all requests to the victim are redirected onto an own
server (for example by means of DNS spoofing), or if the contents of the server are exchanged by
your own contents.
1.5.3 Attacks against the application layer
1.5.3.1 Buffer overflow
If a program contains a buffer with a fixed size and this buffer can be filled with user data without
checking whether these data fit in the buffer, it is possible that an attacker writes purposeful data
over the boundaries of the buffer. He might place for example code to open a shell behind the
boundaries of the buffer and then he can modify the return address of the subprogram so that
this code is executed. In this shell the assailant can drop off commands which are carried out
with the rights of the person that started the attacked program. If you start a service with root
rights and this contains such buffers overflow defects, the attacker can control and destroy the
whole computer.
1.5.3.2 FTP bounce attacks
With a FTP bounce attack an attacker attempts to receive data from a server that is not publicly
accessible over a publicly accessible FTP server. These not accessible servers accept only con-
nections from a certain address space. The publicly accessible FTP server is used in this case as
middleman. Precondition is that the middleman has access to the victim. The attacker creates a
file on the middleman which includes all instructions which are necessary to get the data from
the victim. The instructions must be written down in a language executable by the target server.
By means of the PORT instruction of the FTP server, the attacker can tell the middleman who is
supposed to be attacked (IP:Port). The middleman now passes on the commands from the file to
the victim. The proxy function of the FTP server is responsible for this effect. This attack is used
for example to get programs from american FTP servers that are not legalised for the european
market because of the too large key length in encryption algorithms. The middleman must be
also an american FTP server, but this one must be publicly accessible.
1.5.3.3 WinNuke attack
The WinNuke attack affects only Windows 95, Windows NT and Windows 3.11 machines. The
attacker sends out-of-band data to a Windows machine which is connected to a network and/or
the Internet. Under out-of-band data you can understand a data stream which is sent with a
higher priority than the “normal” data. This is reasonable since these data need not to be sent
in a specific order and should arrive especially fast at the other end of the connection. Usually,
the WinNuke program connects via port 139 (NetBIOS), but other ports are vulnerable too if
they are open. When a Windows machine receives the out-of-band data, it is unable to handle it
and exhibits odd behaviour, ranging from a lost Internet connection to a system crash, which is
resulting in the infamous blue screen.
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1.5.4 Spoofing
Spoofing is a kind of attack in which you try to pretend something. Pretendable are identities,
postal addresses or abilities. You can achieve access onto normally forbidden services with the
simulation of another foreign identity or you can bring somebody to send information to you,
which should not be accessible to everyone. Spoofing uses therefore the advantage that you can
never guarantee, that the communication partner is the one he supposes himself.
1.5.4.1 ARP spoofing
ARP spoofing is described in section 1.5.2.1 on page 20.
1.5.4.2 IP spoofing (forged source address)
When an attacker sends packets with forged source IP address to the victim, you speak of an
IP spoofing attack. That is for example reasonable, when you would like to simulate a familiar
identity in front of a server. Many firewalls protect the net against IP spoofing attacks by looking
whether the source address matches to the input interface. If a packet arrives at the external
interface of the firewall which is equipped with a source address from the internal network than
it is spoofed and it has to be rejected.
1.5.4.3 DNS spoofing
With the use of DNS spoofing, it is possible to redirect connections to servers. The DNS server
of the attacker must only answer faster and with the correct query-ID than the responsible DNS
servers. The DNS server of the attacker must use IP spoofing to pretend to be the real DNS server.
The victim receives a forged IP address to the requested URL. If for example the attacker copies
the content of a web mail gateway, he can spy on the login information of the victim. This attack
is especially easy, if the real DNS server works recursive.
1.5.5 Scanning
1.5.5.1 Port scanning attacks
With a port scan attack an attacker can find out on which computer which operating system
and which services are running. Through that, he figures out the structure of the network. This
knowledge can be misused for attacks. Modern port scanners can detect which type and version
of the operating system is installed on a computer and which software with which version is
listening on an open port. An attacker must only look in bug reports which security holes are
available and then he can choose the tools to attack the system. Most firewalls detect fast and
progressive port scan attacks and block the appropriate packets. Therefore, the attackers must
scan the network slow and in a random manner.
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2 Requirements
Running a firewall can have many reasons. One may be a precaution to protect the passage
between computer networks against attacks. Another could be to balance the load of a network
by routing traffic dynamically. The problem is always to classify traffic in the correct category.
To mark-off technical and organisational domains it is important to introduce policies which de-
scribe different aspects concerning firewalls. Typical policies are for example a security policy
or a usage policy. Policies usually describe what is allowed and what not. These guidelines are
essential for decisions that have to be made in the process of setting up and running a firewall.
The requirements listed in the following sections contain musts and optional terms. This is just
a basic collection and not a complete list. In a determined environment it is important to set up
own policies which complete special requirements.
The following sections discuss the features which a firewall must or should have. It is subdi-
vided in general requirements, optional features, requirements on security, rulesets, usability and
documentation and performance.
2.1 General requirements
The following items in this section are basic requirements on a firewall and the environment:
• Every traffic between computer networks, which are connected by the firewall, must go
through the firewall.
– It is important that the firewall is the sole connection between the networks. On one
hand this is a disadvantage because the firewall will be a bottleneck and thus a single
point of failure. On the other hand it would not make sense to build a wall with a lot
of holes.
Figure 10: Firewall as the sole connection
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• Every traffic that is not explicitly allowed has to be denied.
– This is a default policy concerning the default behaviour. The “default accept” policy
is not recommended for security reasons. A detailed description of policies 1.4.1.2 can
be found at page 7.
• Administration of the firewall must only be possible through a secure path.
– If you have physical access to the machine, you can use the local console. For remote
administration it should be possible to log in by SSH or a comparable technology. If
there is no encrypted access you should use your tools over a subnet which is com-
pletely separated from other networks connected by the firewall. This is described in
more detail in section 1.4.4.14 at page 15.
• The firewall itself must be resistant against attacks.
– A firewall full of bugs is senseless. Thus there should be regular updates and patches
available to fend all of the known attacks described in 1.5 at page 18.
• The firewall must be resistent against failure.
– Since the firewall system is a single point of failure it must be especially resistant
against any failures concerning hard- and software. A full redundant underlying hard-
ware platform is required with uninterruptible power supply. Additionally you can
install the firewall software on more than one hardware platform. Therefore, you can
achieve redundancy on software layer. The simplest way is to use a dedicated firewall
system with “high availability” feature, descripted in section 1.4.4.18.
List 2: General requirements
2.2 Optional features
The following features describe general issues which always depend on the environment the fire-
wall is embedded into. Some of them may not be essential in a specific scenario.
• The firewall should support included application filters and proxies or third-party applica-
tion filters and proxies.
– A proxy works, unlike the packet filter, on the application layer. It enables you to
inspect the protocol used by the application. Therefore, it is possible to filter content.
You can read more about proxies and application filters in section 1.4.1.3 on page 7 and
the following pages.
• The firewall should support network and port address translation.
– NAT and PAT enable you to get access to other networks through the firewall with-
out using public IPs. These computers in the private subnet can only act as clients to
the public networks unless you arrange for public access. See also section 1.4.4.4 at
page 12 for network address translation and section 1.4.4.5 on page 12 for port address
translation.
• The firewall should support virtual private networks.
– VPN is a technique to get access to network A while having an IP from network B.
Thereby IP in IP is used so that an IP packet from network B contains another IP packet
from network A. For a more detailed description see section 1.4.4.6 on page 13.
• The firewall should support user authentication.
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– User authentication is important to actuate a VPN, a proxy or an application filter. It is
also needed in other scenarios. See also section 1.4.4.8 on page 14.
• The firewall should support address aliasing.
– Address aliasing is used to assign multiple addresses to one interface. Therefore, it
is possible to switch between computers providing the same service easily. For more
information see section 1.4.4.9 on page 14.
• The firewall should support time based filtering.
– Time based filtering enables you to define different rules depending on different times.
Thus, it is possible to change the behaviour of the firewall in an organisation so that
there are other rules at worktime than at spare time for example. See also section
1.4.4.10 on page 15.
• The firewall should support embedded antivirus.
– Embedded antivirus is a kind of application filter that is able to deeply inspect packets
on their content. Therefore it is possible to minimise the risk of getting affected by a
virus. Read more in section 1.4.4.11 on page 15.
• The firewall should support URL filter.
– URL filter is also a kind of application filter which enables you to stop access to un-
wanted or forbidden content. See also 1.4.4.12 on page 15.
• The firewall should support traffic management.
– This includes also any variation of queueing and prioritisation. See also section 1.4.4.20
on page 17.
• The firewall should support demilitarised zones.
– A DMZ typically houses all kinds of servers. It separates the more important services
from the less important ones. For more information see section 1.4.4.21 on page 17.
List 3: Optional features
2.3 Rulesets and its configuration
2.3.1 General aspects
• The packet filter must be able to perform the following actions on packets:
– allow
– deny and reject
– deny and drop
– translate (redirect,NAT, PAT)
– defragment
– log
• The packet filter must evaluate the unchanged ruleset in a specified order.
– It is important that rules are written down in a specified order. In most cases the packet
filter will build a tree from the ruleset. This process assumes that the rules are arranged
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in a specified order so that for example the last rule will be evaluated against a packet
first.
• The packet filter should be able to test the syntax of a ruleset on integrity and contradiction
in terms.
– A typical packet filter will manage some thousand rules. It is likely that the maintainer
will make mistakes that lead to a malfunction. For this reason there should be tools to
check the syntax of a ruleset on integrity and contradiction in terms.
• The packet filter should be able to test the semantic of a ruleset on integrity and contradic-
tion in terms.
– For the same reason in the former item there should be tools to check the semantics of
a ruleset on integrity and contradiction in terms.
• It should be possible to define a ruleset in a language with a specified grammar.
– It is important that a language is available to define a ruleset. This textual representa-
tion will be read when the packet filter gets started. It is also possible to use it for the
documentation of the current state and for the reviser.
• The packet filter should be able to handle default rules.
– It should be possible to define default rules which handle packets that did not match
any other rule. This is necessary to implement security policies.
• The packet filter should be able to actuate stateful inspection.
– It is important to be able to associate a packet with a connection. You can read more
about this in section 1.4.4.1 at page 11.
List 4: General requirements on rulesets
The following sections describe different aspects on different layers which the packet filter should
be able to perform.
2.3.2 Subnet layer (OSI layer 2)
The packet filter should be able to act by means of:
• The affected interface
• Incoming or outgoing packets
• All fields of Ethernet:
– Ethernet address of destination
– Ethernet address of sender
– Protocol type
– Checksum
• ATM, ISDN and other network technologies
List 5: Ruleset requirements on the subnet layer
Torsten Ho¨fler, Christian Burkert, Martin Telzer Page 26/157
Comparative firewall study Chemnitz, 1st October 2004
2.3.3 Internet layer (OSI layer 3)
• All fields of IPv4 like:
– Version
– Internet header length
– Type of service
– Total length
– Identification
– May/Don’t Fragment flag
– Last/More Fragment flag
– Fragment Offset






• All fields of ICMPv4 like:
– Type
∗ 0 - Echo Reply
∗ 3 - Destination Unreachable
∗ 4 - Source Quench
∗ 5 - Redirect
∗ 8 - Echo
∗ 11 - Time Exceeded
∗ 12 - Parameter Problem
∗ 13 - Timestamp
∗ 14 - Timestamp Reply
∗ 15 - Information Request
∗ 16 - Information Reply
– Code
– Checksum









• All fields of ICMPv6 like:
– Type
∗ 1 - Destination Unreachable
∗ 2 - Packet Too Big
∗ 3 - Time Exceeded
∗ 4 - Parameter Problem
∗ 128 - Echo Request
∗ 129 - Echo Reply
∗ 130 - Group Membership Query
∗ 131 - Group Membership Report
∗ 132 - Group Membership Reduction
– Code
– Checksum
• IPX, SNMP, PPP and others
List 6: Ruleset requirements on the internet layer
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2.3.4 Transport layer (OSI layer 4)






– Bit 101 - Bit 106 (reserved)
– URG: Urgent Pointer field significant
– ACK: Acknowledgment field signifi-
cant
– PSH: Push Function
– RST: Reset the connection
– SYN: Synchronise sequence numbers











List 7: Ruleset requirements on the transport layer
2.4 Security and its configuration
2.4.1 Access to the firewall
• Access to components of the firewall must only be granted through a secure path.
– To avoid unauthorized access to components of the firewall every authorized access
has to be over a secure path which is the local console or a secure shell for example.
This applies also for things like administration, logging, alarms, and sending protocol
data. You can read more about secure paths in section 1.4.4 at page 11.
• User authentication must happen with strong encryption
– It is important to encrypt authentication data to avoid unauthorised access. This also
includes the storage of passwords.
• The role of a reviser, who can only check configuration and logging, must be offered.
– The role of a reviser is completely separated from the role of the administrator. He has
access to information concerning the firewall but cannot change anything. His task is
to control other people working on the firewall. A more complete description can be
found in section 1.4.2 at page 8.
• Access to the system must be logged.
– Every access attempt and every successfull login should be logged to a persistent stor-
age.
List 8: Security requirements - access to the firewall
2.4.2 Hardening the operating system
• The firewall should only depend on software which is necessary for the operativeness.
– To minimise the probability of bugs in the system running the firewall it is important
to install as less as possible software. Only an operating system, the firewall software
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itself and necessary software for its operativeness should be installed. See also 1.4.4.22
at page 18.
List 9: Security requirements - hardening the operating system
2.4.3 Selftests
• The firewall must be able to test its integrity in non regular intervals
– There should be tools which test the integrity of the firewall regularly but not at the
same time. There should be external and internal tests. External tests can check the
integrity with known attacks. Internal tests can use checksums to assure that binaries
are inviolated (for example by rootkits). A common tool for this task is tripwire which
can be found at the Tripwire homepage [http://www.tripwire.org]
• The firewall must be able to list the current connections
– All currently established or waiting connections should be accessible (for debugging/-
monitoring).
List 10: Security requirements - selftests
2.4.4 Guessing and fingerprinting
• The firewall must be able to hide its properties.
– It must not be possible for an external entity to gain knowledge about the firewall and
its properties.
• The firewall must use random sequence numbers.
– It must not be possible for an external entity to predict the sequence number of a new
initiated connection. The choice of sequence numbers has to be cryptographically se-
cure.
• The firewall must use random IP ID’s.
– It must not be possible for an external entity to predict IP ID’s. The choice of IP ID’s
has to be cryptographically secure.
• The firewall must be able to rewrite packets.
– To prevent fingerprinting it is important to be able to rewrite packets.
List 11: Security requirements - guessing and fingerprinting
2.4.5 Logging and notification
Not only for legal reasons, it is important to log information. The decision which information is
necessary has to be written down in a policy. A typical scenario is logging information for the
reviser. Another would be to detect attacks and track the process back to its cause.
• The firewall must be able to log to a persistent storage.
– It is important not to loose information.
• The amount of the logged information must only be limited by the sytem memory.
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– There must not be any other limitation to the amount of the logged information than
the size of the available memory.
• The firewall must be able to log any information which it can filter by.
– It must be possible to log arbitrary packet information and contents.
• The firewall must be able to alert the firewall administrator in case of an emergency.
– It must be possible to alert the firewall administrator by courtesy of a common mecha-
nism, e.g. e-mail, pager or sms.
List 12: Security requirements - logging and notification
2.4.6 Default behaviour on start-up
• The firewall must start up in a secure state.
– It is essential that the firewall is in a secure state when it starts up. This also includes
reboots after a crash.
• By default the firewall must deny all packets which are not explicitely allowed.
– To ensure security it is important that, after starting up, the firewall will deny packets
which are not explicitly allowed.
List 13: Security requirements - default behaviour on start-up
2.4.7 Fending known attacks
• The firewall must fend known attacks.
– The firewall should protect the user from known attacks. The firewall needs a possi-
bility to get the newest attack patterns and virus signatures from a trustable source.
There are several databases in the Internet, which provide the possiblity to download
the newest updates. These databases are provided by a firewall manufacturer to their
customers and are not accessible for free.
• The firewall must be able to reassemble packets.
– Fragments, except the first one, contain less information than packets. This means that
the firewall has to make a decision on less information. There are known attacks that
use this characteristic. Therefore, the reassembly of packets should be done by default.
List 14: Security requirements - fending known attacks
2.5 Usability and documentation
Requirements on usability are important for the everyday use and administration of a firewall.
The administrator must be able to act in a fast and efficient way to assure security and availability
of computer networks. At least the following issues are a basic assumption to improve usability:
• The firewall must be easily comprehensible and transparent. There must not be any hidden
options or implicit rules.
• It must be possible to define the ruleset of a firewall in an easy way. Syntax and semantics
must be easily comprehensible.
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• The firewall should be able to store the current ruleset so that it can be restored easily after
a crash.
• The firewall must be able to log in at least one widely known format.
• The firewall software must be able to log information and alarm signals directly to the un-
derlying operating system.
• The firewall must be able to send logging information and alarm signals over the network
to a central place through a secure path instantly.
• The firewall must be able to react on specified incidents automatically.
List 15: Usability issues
Documentation is a very important issue to guarantee security and functionality of the firewall.
It is essential for a correct realisation of policies. Also it is very important that, for example,
the firewall is able to document its state. This ensures that people, responsible for the system,
are replaceable. A not to neglect issue when somebody leaves the organisation. The following
requirements describe an extensive documented system:
• There must be a detailed manual, an online help and a collection of frequently asked ques-
tions.
• The documentation must be available in various languages.
• The documentation must be available in various medias.
• The documentation must explain the dependency on other software in detail.
• The documentation must discuss known bugs in detail.
• The documentation must be up-to-date.
• There should be a website with additional information.
List 16: Documentation issues
2.6 Performance
The tests concerning performance have to be separated into three classes.
2.6.1 Throughput
The throughput of the firewall system depends on many different factores. The more power the
hardware platform has, the better is the throughput of the system. You can also imagine that the
packet size influences the throughput. The firewall can check a few large packets faster than a
lot of small packets. The throughput depends also on the size of the ruleset. Since the firewall
must go through the entire ruleset, the firewall is more busy when you use a large ruleset. Several
filters decrease the performance because the packets have to be examined for different aspects.
When you increase the logging level the performance decreases because the system is blocked
by I/O42 operations to write the logging information onto hard disk. Most likely the throughput
decreases when you activate NAT and PAT.
• The throughput should scale with CPU43 power, system memory and the speed of the net-
work interfaces.
42I/O - Input/Output
43CPU - Central Processing Unit
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• The throughput should scale with the packet size.
• The throughput should scale negative with the size of the ruleset and the use of filters like
stateful filtering.
• The throughput should decrease with the level of logging.
• The throughput should not be influenced by the number of simultaneous connections.
• The throughput should decrease when using NAT/PAT.
List 17: Requirements concerning throughput
2.6.2 Latency
The performance of latency depends like throughput on many different factores. The latency
increases when the firewall is under heavy load. But it should lower, when you increase the
power of the hardware platform. When you have a large ruleset, a high level of logging or you use
special filters the latency increases. The larger the packets, the larger is the latency time because it
takes longer to rewrite a large packet. When you activateNAT and PAT the latency time increases
because the tables mentioned in section 1.4.4.4 and section 1.4.4.5 have to be examined.
• Latency should be influenced positive by increasing CPU power, system memory and the
speed of the network interfaces.
• Latency should decrease with decreasing packet size.
• Latency will probably increase with the size of the ruleset and the use of filters like stateful
filtering.
• Latency is influenced negative by the level of logging.
• Latency should not be influenced by the number of simultaneous connections.
• Latency is influenced by the load on the firewall system.
• Latency is influenced by activating NAT and PAT.
List 18: Requirements concerning latency
2.6.3 Maximum number of connections
Many hardware firewalls limit the number of simultaneous connections. For example the number
of concurrent connections on Cisco firewalls varies between 7 500 (Cisco PIX 501 with 16 MB
RAM) and 500 000 (Cisco PIX 535 with 1 GB RAM). But there are other firewall manufacturer
which sell firewalls with only 1 000 or 2 000 possible simultaneous connections.
The number of simultaneous connections should only be limited by the memory of the firewall
system. When you increase the available system memory, the system is able to manage more
connections. When a firewall is usedwithNAT and PAT the number of connections is also limited
by the size of the port address table.
In most cases the underlying operating system has also limitations. For example the number of
open file descriptors is limited per process and for the entire operating system. The number of
open file descriptors is closely connected to the number of connections since many things are
handled as files in UNIX.
• The number of simultaneous connections should only be limited by the amount of available
system memory.
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• When NAT and PAT is used, the number of possible connections is limited by the size of
the used table.
• The number of possible connections should scale with the build-in system memory.
List 19: Requirements concerning the maximum number of connections
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3 Environment
This section describes the available resources to perform the tests and how they are combined in
scenarios to test something useful.
Section 3.1 describes what hardware and software is used to build the firewall system. Section
3.2 and section 3.3 describe the hardware and software which is used to test the firewall system.
Section 3.4 desribes the tools which are used to perform tests on the firewall. Section 3.5 lists the
rulesets in an abstract manner and in a form which is adapted to the firewall software. Section
3.6 describes how the computers have to be connected to perform a test and section 3.7 shows the
combination of hardware and software which are used to build up the firewall system and the
version numbers of the software components.
3.1 Firewall environment
This study considers the firewall system as a combination of the firewall hardware (see section
3.1.1 on page 34), an operating system (see section 3.1.2 on page 37) and the firewall software (see
section 3.1.3 on page 40).
3.1.1 Used firewall hardware
There are two different types of computers available which can be used as firewall hardware. By
default the faster machine should be used as the firewall hardware (computer 1). If someting
important, like the operating system or the network interfaces do not work with computer 1 then
computer 2 is used as alternative machine.
3.1.1.1 Computer 1
• Processor:
– AMD Athlon XP 2200+
– Real clock speed: 1808 MHz
– L1 Cache: 64K (64 bytes/line)
– L2 Cache: 256K (64 bytes/line)
• Mainboard:
– Mainboard Gigabyte K7 Triton 400 GA-7VA
– North bridge: VIA KT400
– South bridge: VIA VT8235
– IO-Control: IT8705
• BUS/IDE:
– PCI clock: 33 MHz
– Memory clock speed: 267 MHz
– UDMA 133 controller
– Peripheral controller: VIA VT8235
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• Memory:
– 512MB DDRAM (one modul)
• First and second network device:
– Intel Pro/1000
– 1000 MBit ethernet controller
– PCI 32 Bit
– Version 4.4.12-k1
– 8254 OEM
– IEEE 802.3ab (1000BASE-T)
– IEEE 802.3u (100BASE-TX)
– IEEE 802.3 (10BASE-T)
• Third network device:
– Fastline II (DEC chip)
– 100 MBit ethernet controller
– PCI 32 Bit, PCI specification 2.1
– PCI-PCI bridge DC 21152
– Ethernet controller DC 21143
– IEEE 802.3u (100BASE-TX)
– IEEE 802.3 (10BASE-T)
• Hard drive:
– IBM HDD 60 GB
– IC35L060AVVA07-0 ATA disk drive
• Miscellaneous:
– Creative Soundblaster CT4750 (ES1371 chip)
– DVD Toshiba SDM 1712
– TEAC Floppy 3,5”
– GeForce2 MX400 64MB graphics card
List 20: Firewall hardware 1
3.1.1.2 Computer 2
• Processor:
– AMD Athlon 500
– Real clock speed: 500 MHz
• Mainboard:
– Mainboard Gigabyte GA-7IX
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– North bridge: AMD 751 (Irongate)
– South bridge: AMD 756 (Viper)
– IO-control: Winbond W83977EF
• BUS/IDE:
– PCI clock: 33 MHz
– UDMA 66 controller
– Peripheral controller: VIA VT8235
• Memory:
– 128MB SDRAM (one modul)
• First and second network device:
– Intel Pro/1000
– 1000 MBit Ethernet controller
– PCI 32 Bit
– Version 4.4.12-k1
– 8254 OEM
– IEEE 802.3ab (1000BASE-T)
– IEEE 802.3u (100BASE-TX)
– IEEE 802.3 (10BASE-T)
• Third network device:
– 3COM 905B-TX
– 100 MBit Ethernet controller
– PCI 32 Bit
– IEEE 802.3u (100BASE-TX)
– IEEE 802.3 (10BASE-T)
• Hard drive:
– IBM DPTA 353750 P510A30A 32 GB
– Quantum Fireball SE8.4A API.0A00 8 GB
• Miscellaneous:
– Creative Soundblaster AWE64
– CDROM IDE Toshiba XM-6602B 1017
– Floppy 3,5”
– Elsa Erazor III RIVA128 graphics card
List 21: Firewall hardware 2
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3.1.2 Operating systems for the firewall
Most modern firewall systems rest on very different operating systems. The underlying operating
system is responsible for security and performance as well as the firewall software itself.
Figure 11: History of used operating systems
Figure 11 shows how the used operating systems are related to each other, but it does not show
a complete tree of the evolution of operating systems. You can see only a subset of operating
systems which play a special key role for the development of the used operating systems.
3.1.2.1 Windows 2003 as firewall operating system
If people talk about Microsoft products with respect to safety, they mock mostly. Microsoft’s
operating systems were never especially secure products in the past. However, their products
had not to be secure from a historical viewpoint. How can it be that Microsoft now uses Windows
2000 and Windows 2003 as basis for a high security product? How should it protect a network
against attackers, if the firewall runs on an operating system, which is denounced as a whole
security hole?
Apparently Microsoft noticed in the past, that their architecture is not suitable for high availabil-
ity services and changed something in the security architecture. You should not subject Microsoft
products to the same investigation, as UNIX products because they have to be assigned to a differ-
ent class of operating systems from historical point of view. You should also notice, that Microsoft
products are a popular objective for hackers because of the wide usage of their operating systems.
Finally, it is worthwhile to attack a system, where the probability is quite high, to get something
useful (like passwords for home banking software). Furthermore, Microsoft comes to decry in the
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media in last time because a lot of viruses and worms have been developed especially to use the
security holes of Windows.
Since the takeover of DOS, Microsoft has attempted to develop a product with respect to user
friendliness . A network like the Internet was not to be thought of yet. The computer wasmade for
a single person and nobody had to fear for bad guys. With the time Internet on the basis of TCP/IP
became interesting to the publicity and Microsoft had to react fast, in order to stay competitive.
You can see this for example in the only rudimentary TCP/IP implementation of Windows R©
3.11. The development in the direction of user friendliness hampered the development of a good
security architecture enormously.
With the development of Windows NT, Microsoft merges safety with user friendliness. This is
the only way to stay in business concerning the Internet. In Windows NT a security model was
implemented for this reason. The most important element of this security model concerns access
control. For the first time, it was possible to decide whether someone can access files, services and
directories. UNIX has this feature since the first versions. It belongs to the concept. WithWindows
2000, Microsoft merged the aspect of the security from Windows NT and the aspect of the total
user friendliness fromWindows 9x to one product and expanded it later to Windows XP/2003. In
modern versions Windows offers the same services as UNIX does. However, Microsoft demands
a lot of money for this functionality.
This study examines also Microsoft products whether they are useable as security products.
3.1.2.2 Linux as firewall operating system
Linux was introduced to the hacker scene in October 1991 by Linus Torvalds. It was intended to
work as a free Unix-like operating system for the cheap i386 architecture. While Linux initially
was not really useful except as a toy, it soon gathered enough features to be interesting even for
people uninterested in operating system development.
Linux itself as an operating system consists only of a kernel. It is like a supervisor engine to ad-
ministrate the hardware resources (and some logical resources) and to distribute them to several
processes. One of these resources is for example the network connectivity.
The whole development is structured in different versions of Linux. Today there are versioning
patterns such as “2.2.14”. The first number is the major version number. The second number is
the minor revision number. The third number is the patch level version. At any given time there
is a group of kernels that are considered as “stable releases” and another group that is considered
as “development”. If the second number of a kernel is even, then that kernel is a stable release.
Since version 2.0, Linux (officially) offered stable routing and firewall possibilities. There is one
official packet filter package available for each kernel.
• ipfwadm - Linux 2.0
• ipchains - Linux 2.2
• iptables - Linux 2.4/2.6
List 22: Official Linux packet filter packages
The whole packet filter branch is now managed by the netfilter team.
Only iptables - the newest packet filter for the kernel version 2.4/2.6 - will be investigated in this
study, because the old packages are nearly outdated and should not be used very often.
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3.1.2.3 BSD as firewall operating system
BSD stands for “Berkeley Software Distribution”. It is the Unix developed at the University of
California in Berkeley. It has derived from AT&T’s Unix. Today, due to legal issues, all of AT&T’s
code has been replaced by new code.
There are three very popular BSDs: OpenBSD, NetBSD and FreeBSD. They are all free and actively
developed. Another BSD is BSD/OS, which is commercial and not freely available. Darwin is the
heart of Apple’s OS X and derived from FreeBSD. For workstations or diskless systems, there is
PicoBSD, a version of FreeBSD that aims to fit on a floppy disk. This is of course not a complete
list.
In the following sections we describe OpenBSD, which attaches most importance on security,
NetBSD, the most portable one, and FreeBSD, the most popular one.
OpenBSD
OpenBSD is a free, multi-platform 4.4 BSD-based UNIX-like operating system. OpenBSD was an
offshoot of NetBSD that focused on security. It is available for alpha, amd64, cats, hp300, hppa,
i386, mac68k macppc, mvme68k, mvme88k, sparc, sparc64 and vax.
On OpenBSD, pf44 is next to ipf45 the dominant firewall. Pf is part of the OpenBSD kernel and is
developed steady. There are others available but they play a tangential role and are not officially
supported.
NetBSD
NetBSD is a free and highly portable UNIX-like open source operating system, available for many
platforms, from 64-bit AlphaServers and desktop systems to handheld and embedded devices.
NetBSD split from FreeBSD in an effort to support a wider range of platforms. Like FreeBSD, it is
developed and maintained steady by a large team of individuals.
One of the primary focuses of the NetBSD project is to make the OS extremely portable. NetBSD
has been ported to a large number of hardware platforms. NetBSD is also highly interoperable,
implementing many standard APIs and network protocols, and emulating many other systems
API’s.
There are two free and popular firewalls available for NetBSD. Pf has currently been ported from
OpenBSD. Ipf is part of the NetBSD kernel. Both are also available for FreeBSD.
FreeBSD
FreeBSD is an advanced operating system for x86 compatible, AMD64, Alpha, IA-64, PC-98 and
UltraSPARC R© architectures. It is derived from BSD, the version of UNIX R© developed at the
University of California, Berkeley. It is developed and maintained by a large team of individuals.
FreeBSD offers advanced networking, performance, security and compatibility features which
are still missing in other operating systems, even in some of the best commercial ones. It also
provides robust network services which are made to work under the heaviest loads and uses
memory efficiently to provide good response times for thousands of simultaneous user processes.
There are three popular firewalls available for FreeBSD. Pf has been ported from OpenBSD and
is one of the most powerful filters. It is available from the FreeBSD ports collection. Ipf is also a
popular one. Both are also available for NetBSD. Ipfw is part of the FreeBSD kernel but it appears
44pf - Packetfilter
45ipf - IP Filter
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that ipfw46 will be replaced by pf in FreeBSD 5.3 or future versions. This is also the reason why
this study does not examine ipfw on FreeBSD.
3.1.2.4 Solaris 9 as firewall operating system
Solaris is an UNIX operating system of Sun Microsystems. Sun Microsystems was founded in
February 1982 in the californian Silicon Valley by the german Andreas von Bechtolsheim and
four further employees. In the same year, the marketing of the first Sun workstation started.
In the history of UNIX, you can observe that the development splits into two lines. On the one
hand, there is the BSD line and on the other hand there is the System V line. Sun developed a
long time with SunOS according to the BSD line, however, and then they changed the side and
developed Solaris according to the System V standard, because the System V standard was rather
regarded as perspective for the future.
The development of Solaris is closely connected with the SPARC architecture which has also been
developed by Sun. Since Solaris 2.7 (SunOS 5.7 analogous), Sun has offered continuous 64-bit
architecture to the Solaris line. However, a x86 version is also available. Solaris is available free
for the non-commercial usage. Sun therefore offers a ”Free Solaris License”.
Since Solaris is a descendant of the UNIX operating system, it seems likely, that it is very well
suitable as a server operating system because of the high system stability. Solaris as basis of a
firewall system should be taken into account, because a firewall presupposes a very stable and
secure operating system.
3.1.3 Firewall software
This section describes the different firewall software solutions and what they pretend to be able
to.
3.1.3.1 Packetfilter
Packetfilter is BSD’s most popular system for firewalling. Its focus is on filtering Ethernet traffic.
It was originally developed by Daniel Hartmeier as part of the OpenBSD 3.0 kernel and is also
available for FreeBSD and NetBSD now. Packetfilter is capable of normalising and conditioning
traffic, providing Quality of Service and actuate Network Address Translation.
• stateful inspection
• support forNAT and PAT
• support for extensive traffic management
• support for proxies and application filters
• support for extensive logging
List 23: Features of Packetfilter
The main website of Packetfilter [http://www.benzedrine.cx/pf.html] mainly addresses news
about pf. Most information can be found in the chapter of Packetfilter [http://www.openbsd.org/faq/pf/]
in the OpenBSD FAQ and in the manpage.
46ipfw - IP Firewall
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3.1.3.2 IP Tables
IP Tables is a generic table structure for the definition of packet filtering rulesets. Each rule within
a table consists out of a number of classifiers (matches) and one connected action (target).
IP Tables is strongly connected to Netfilter, which creates an interface from the IP Tables language
definition to the kernel network stack. Netfilter is a set of hooks inside the kernel which allow
kernel modules to register callback functions. Each registered function is called for every packet
which passes the network stack. The several modules are now able to evaluate the packet in
different characteristics and carry out some special actions depending on the evaluation results.
• Stateful inspection
• Support forNAT and PAT
• Support for proxys and application filters
• Support for logging
List 24: Features of IP Tables
More information can be found at the official Netfilter homepage [http://www.netfilter.org].
3.1.3.3 Internet security and acceleration server
The Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server is available as an add-on to Microsoft
Windows 2000 andWindows 2003. It is an advanced firewall product with filtering on application
layer, proxy function and VPN access. Microsoft focuses on a completely graphical user interface
and easy administration per drag and drop. At this point of time, only an evaluation edition is
available. This version is restricted to a 120-day evaluation period.
• Presets for different network layouts
• Definition of different policies for different networks
• Stateful inspection
• Support forNAT and PAT
• VPN support
• Included proxies and application filters
• Support for logging
• Administration by GUI
List 25: Features of ISA Server 2004 Beta2
At the end of the year 2004, Microsoft is going to provide an enterprise edition of the ISA 2004
Server. This version should provide a higher level of scalability, availability and manageability.
3.1.3.4 SunScreen
Since Solaris 9, Sun offers the build in firewall SunScreen 3.2. In previous versions of Solaris, there
was a free version called SunScreen lite and the big brother SunScreen which is liable for costs.
SunScreen is considered by Sun to be a full-featured firewall. As described on Sys Admin Mag-
azine [http://www.samag.com/documents/s=7667/sam0213l/0213l.htm] it has a large feature
set and provides the bulk of the features found in other firewalls.
• Stateful inspection
• Support forNAT
• VPN support (SKIP and IPSec/IKE)
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• Included proxies and application filters
• Support for logging
• Administration by GUI and command line
• 130 multithreaded stateful packet filters
List 26: Features of Sunscreen 3.2
3.1.3.5 IP Filter
IP Filter, written by Darren Reed, is available for many operating systems like FreeBSD, NetBSD,
OpenBSD, Solaris, SunOS, BSD/OS, IRIX, HP-UX, Tru64 and QNX. It is also a widely used fire-
wall with an active community. IP Filter is a free and open source software but it is not licensed
under GPL.
• Stateful inspection
• Support forNAT and PAT
• Support for proxies and application filters
• Support for extensive logging
List 27: Features of IP Filter
The main website of IP Filter [http://coombs.anu.edu.au/ avalon/] is a quick overview of ipf.
An IP Filter howto [http://www.obfuscation.org/ipf/] and an IP Filter FAQ [http://www.phildev.net/ipf/]
are also available. The manpages give a detailed help.
3.2 Clients
The clients should simulate the two networks which are connected by the firewall system.
3.2.1 Used client hardware
3.2.1.1 Computers
There are 14 computers with the same equipment available which can be used as clients to simu-
late two networks which are connected to the firewall. Each network should contain seven com-
puters. One network is called the public network (right network) and one is called the private
network (left network).
• Processor:
– AMD Athlon XP 2200+
– Real clock speed: 1808 MHz
– L1 Cache: 64K (64 bytes/line)
– L2 Cache: 256K (64 bytes/line)
• Mainboard
– Mainboard: Gigabyte K7 Triton 400 GA-7VA
– North bridge: VIA KT400
– South bridge: VIA VT8235
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– IO-Control: IT8705
• BUS/IDE:
– PCI clock: 33 MHz
– Memory clock speed: 267 MHz
– UDMA 133 controller
– Peripheral controller: VIA VT8235
• Memory:
– 512MB DDRAM (one modul)
• First network device:
– Intel Pro/1000
– 1000 MBit Ethernet controller
– PCI 32 Bit
– Version 4.4.12-k1
– 8254 OEM
– IEEE 802.3ab (1000BASE-T)
– IEEE 802.3u (100BASE-TX)
– IEEE 802.3 (10BASE-T)
• Second network device:
– Fastline II (DEC Chip)
– 100 MBit Ethernet controller
– PCI 32 Bit, PCI specification 2.1
– PCI-PCI bridge DC 21152
– Ethernet controller DC 21143
– IEEE 802.3u (100BASE-TX)
– IEEE 802.3 (10BASE-T)
• Hard drive:
– IBM HDD 60 GB
– IC35L060AVVA07-0 ATA disk drive
• Miscellaneous:
– Creative Soundblaster CT4750 (ES1371 chip)
– DVD Toshiba SDM 1712
– TEAC Floppy 3,5”
– GeForce2 MX400 64MB graphics card
List 28: Details of the used computers
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3.2.2 Operating system for the clients
3.2.2.1 Requirements for a client operating system
The clients have to cause a load that is high enough to lead the firewall server to its limit. Each
client is equipped with gigabit network, so we need an operating systemwhich supports the used
gigabit cards (see: 3.2.1.1 on page 42) and is fast enough to saturate the network. We found a com-
parative study of Felix von Leitner (“ Unix scalability benchmarks [http://bulk.fefe.de/scalability/]”)
which covers exactly with the most data we need for a proper choose of the operating system.






List 29: Compared client operating systems
in sevaral parameters, and we chose some of them adapted to our use case:
• socket() [http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007904975/functions/socket.html] latency
• bind() [http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007904975/functions/bind.html] latency
• connect() [http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007904975/functions/connect.html] la-
tency
• Number of possible open connections
List 30: Comparision parameters for client OS
and this lead to the following results:
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Latency of the socket() function
The latency of the socket() operation was analysed by calling the function 10000 times and by
mesauring the CPU cycles on a P3/900. The Result is shown in figure 12. FreeBSD outperforms
all other operating systems in this benchmark. And every other operating system scaled well
(< O(n)).
Figure 12: Latency of the socket() function
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Latency of the bind() function
The latency of bind() was measured by calling a bind() to port 0 in the same run as the socket()
benchmark. The result is shown in figure 13. The graph of FreeBSD and Linux 2.4 were overdrawn
by the Linux 2.6 graph. All scaled with O(1) very well.
Figure 13: Latency of the bind() function
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Latency of the connect() function
The connect() latency was measured by taking the time between noticing the connection attempt
and calling accept() [http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007904975/functions/accept.html].
The result is shown in figure 14. FreeBSD and Linux were omitted, because they scaled in O(1).
OpenBSD was with O(n) outperformed.
Figure 14: Latency of the connect() function
Number of possible open connections
The clients must be able to manage a lot of TCP connections. Each operating system provides
another limit of possible open connections. This value is limited in most cases by the kernel
which can only handle a certain number of open file handles. The test was performed with the
tool described in section 3.4.1.3 on page 59 on FreeBSD5.2.1 and Linux kernel 2.6.6. The FreeBSD
can open around 9400 connections and then the kernel writes an error message to the screen. This
is really few. The Linux kernel can open around 50000. Then the kernel writes an error message to
/var/log/syslog. The problem is, that the function which builds up more than 5000 connections
does not produce an error. The user does not notice whether a connect() was succesfull or not.
For all that, the Linux kernel is the better choice.
Conclusion
With these measurements the operating system is really easy to choose. Linux 2.6 outperformed
all others in nearly every test and scaled with O(1) very well. According to the timeline (3.7 on
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page 95) a vanilla Linux 2.6.6 kernel from Kernel.org [http://www.kernel.org] will be used as
client operating system.




There are two gigabit switches and a lot of cables available.
• Allnet ALL0478
– Gigabit Ethernet switch
– Chipset: Tamarack TC9208M [http://www.tmi.com.tw/]
– 8 Auto-negotiation ports
– IEEE 802.3ab 1000BASE-T
– Protocol: CSMA/CD
– Star topology
– Method: store and forward
– 512KB RAM puffer per device
– 8KB for MAC address memory in the address table
– Self learning / auto aging
– throughput: see section 3.3.3.1
List 31: Details of the used switches
3.3.2 Cables
• DRAKA multimedia cable [http://www.drakamc.de/]




List 32: Details of the used cables
3.3.3 Performance of the network architecture
These tests are necessary to measure the performance of the test environment independend of the
firewall system. The results are used to rate the results of the individual firewalls in section 5.
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3.3.3.1 Maximum throughput through the switch
To compare the firewalls, the absolute speed limit of the used network hardware must be tested.
It is recommended to know how much traffic the switches can transfer. Therefore, the available
computers are connected to a switch and the two switches are connected to each other like in
figure 32 in section 3.6.5 on page 93. As result the test determines whether the available switches
are able to run at full gigabit speed or if they limit the bandwidth to a lower value. The result
stands for the absolute maximum throughput the firewall can reach in the tests.
For the test, the firewall system must be removed from the network. The switches for the private
subnet and the public subnet are connected directly. All computers get an IP address from the
same address space. As test-tool a client-server software is wanted. The client sends packets
to the server and the server sends packets to the client. When the client has sent and received
a fixed amount of data, he has to stop the time and has to calculate the throughput (see tool
throughput test in section 3.4.1.1). All seven clients and servers should generate the traffic.
Execution of the test:
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 5 (see 3.6.5)
• for $i in (1..7) do
right$i: start throughput_test_server 5000
left$i: start throughput_test_client 5000
• for $i in (50 100 200 .. 1500) do
left1: start throughput_test_overseer 5001 $i 30 scenario1.conf
wait until throughput is displayed
for $i in (2000 4000 8000 16000 32000 64000) do
left1: start throughput_test_overseer 5001 $i 30 scenario1.conf
wait until throughput is displayed
Results (see Figure 15):
Maximum throughput through the switch
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Table 1: Maximum throughput through the switch
Figure 15: Maximum throughput through the switch
3.3.3.2 Maximum throughput limited by the computer architecture
If a network interface card supports gigabit network, then that does not automatically result in
one gigabit throughput. Since the motherboard in computer 1 (see section 3.1.1.1) is not really
fast, it never can obtain the full one gigabit throughput. This test should obtain the maximum
throughput of computer 1. The test is performed with the software described in section 3.4.1.1 on
page 53. Seven clients and computer 1 are used in this test. The computers are arranged according
to scenario 6 described in 3.6.6 on page 93. As operating system Linux 2.6 is used since it should
be the best choice (see section 3.2.2.1).
Execution of the test:
• for $i in (1..7) do
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left$i: throughput\_test\_client 5000
• for $i in (5000 5010 5020 .. 5060) do
right1: start throughput_test_server $i
• for $i in (100 200 .. 1500) do
left1: start throughput_test_overseer 5001 $i 30 flood.conf
wait until throughput is displayed
for $i in (2000 4000 8000 16000 32000 64000) do
left1: start throughput_test_overseer 5001 $i 30 scenario1.conf
wait until throughput is displayed
Results (see Figure 16):
Maximum throughput limited by the computer architecture





















64 000 rpre−throughput−nic21= 0.24
Table 2: Maximum throughput limited by the computer architecture
It should be noted that there is an increasing probability for packet loss in proportion to the packet
size because of the use ofUDP. This is a reason for the little throughput at 32 000 and 64 000 bytes
packet size.
During testing computer 1, there was another computer with an Athlon 64 processor temporary
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Figure 16: Maximum throughput limited by computer architecture
available. The same test on this architecture results in ≈900 MBit/s throughput. As a result, the
little throughput of computer 1 depends on the architecture (bus, chipset).
As you can see in section 3.1.1.2, there was a second test system available. Computer 2 was only
used if an operating system was not compatible with it. The test above was not performed with
this machine, but the tests with the SunScreen has shown an interesting fact. Computer 2 seems to
be faster than computer 1, even though its processor works at a lower frequency. A performance
test with SunScreen on Solaris on computer 2, results in≈330MBit/s throughput, while Linux 2.6,
which is seen as ”best” operating system, performes only ≈215 MBit/s throughput on computer
1. A test with Linux 2.6 on computer 2 results in 146 MBit/s, which demonstrates, that computer
2 is not faster than computer 1, but that Solaris works faster than Linux 2.6. It is to estimate,
that SunScreen on Solaris on computer 1 would work still faster on computer 1 if it would be
compatible.
3.3.3.3 Best latency time through the wire
This test measures the time for the transmission of a packet from a computer which is connected
to the first switch to a computer which is connected to the second switch. As test tool the tool
described in 3.4.1.2 is used. The computers have to be arranged according to scenario 5 (see
3.6.5).
Execution of the test:
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 5 (see 3.6.5)
• left1: start udpclient 192.168.101.1
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• right1: start udpserver 192.168.100.1
Results (see Figure 17):
Best latency time through the wire











1 000 rpre−latency10= 77.58
1 100 rpre−latency11= 83.84
1 200 rpre−latency12= 89.98
1 300 rpre−latency13= 95.61
1 400 rpre−latency14= 101.94
1 500 rpre−latency15= 108.44
2 000 rpre−latency16= 116.21
4 000 rpre−latency17= 160.59
8 000 rpre−latency18= 264.32
16 000 rpre−latency19= 456.72
32 000 rpre−latency20= 854.63
64 000 rpre−latency21=1700.59
Table 3: Best latency time through the wire
3.4 Testsoftware
This section descibes what software is developed and used to perform performance and security
tests.
3.4.1 Software for performance measurements
One of the goals of this study is the development of a general tool, with which you can automatise
the performance tests with many involved computers.
3.4.1.1 Throughput test - a tool to measure the throughput
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Figure 17: Best latency time through the wire
General requirements
• A server which receives data is required.
• A client which can send data to the server is required.
• A program is needed which coordinates the client and server software on the different com-
puters.
List 33: List of general requirements for throughput test
Throughput test server - the server for throughput measurements
The server should be able to receive packets. UDP should be used as transport protocol. TCP
is unsuitable because it has flow control features. The slow start algorithm would cause, that
the connection is not fully loaded, although there are some capacities left. To receive packets,
the server must listen on a defined port. The server calculates the throughput by counting the
received data and stopping the time. Therefore, the server is interrupted in a special time interval
by a signal. After stopping it calculates the throughput and displays it on the screen.
The program which coordinates the several servers must also connect to the server. Therefore
the server listens on an additional TCP socket, where he receives the test configuration from the
central instance. The test configuration includes the size of the packets to receive, the time interval
to measure, the port the central instance is listening on to send back the results, the UDP port the
client expects the server is listening on and an identifier. When the server sends back its result
it must specify its identifier, so that the central instance knows who has sent him a result. This
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is necessary because if the firewall acts in PAT mode, the servers can not be differed by the IP
address.
Input variables:
• Port the server listens on
• Test configuration
Output variables:
• Throughput of incoming traffic
To start the program type ./throughput test server <port to listen on> .
Throughput test client - the client for throughput measurements
The client should send a certain number of packets to the server. As already mentioned in 3.4.1.1,
UDP is used as transport protocol.
The client listens like the server on an TCP socket and reads through the socket the configuration
from a central instance. He needs to know, who is the assigned server, on which ports does the
server listen on, on which port is the central instance accessible, how large should the packets be
he sends and how long should the measurement be.
Input variables:
• Port the client listens on
• Test configuration
To start the program type ./throughput test client <port to listen on> .
Requirements of the coordination software
This program is the central instance mentioned above. Below, this central instance is called over-
seer.
Each client has to connect to a different server. Each test has to be started at the same time. The
results of the different servers have to be accumulated. Each client and each server has to know
the configuration for the test.
Therefore, the overseer reads the configuration for the test scenario from a config file. Then it
sends the test configuration to each involved computer. The computers perform now the test
and the server sends back the results to the coordination software. Therefore, the coordination
software must listen on a defined port. When it has collected all results the coordination software
displays the entire throughput on the screen.
Input variables:
• Which computers are involved in the measurement.
• Which server belongs to a client.
• Which packet size should be tested.
• On which port is the computer listening to receive the configuration.
• On which port is an server accessible for the client.
• How long should the client send data.
• In which interval should the server measure the throughput.
Output variables:
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• Entire throughput for all computers.
To start the program type ./throughput test overseer <port to listen on> <packet size> <measurement
interval> <config file> .
Syntax of the config file: Each computer (servers and clients) involved in the measurement has
one line with four arguments in the config file.
<computer name> <assigned server> <port accesible for coordination software> <port the server is
listening on for measurement>
Since a server has no assigned server, it is represented in this form in the config file:
<server name> <server name> <port accesible for coordination software> <port the server is listening
on for measurement>
In a line of a server, the specification of the port the server listens on for measurement is ignored
by the server. If the server wants to listen on a variable port for each test, he must bind the
socket for each test on another port. If an user specifies for each test the same server port the
tool crashes because if a socket is closed which listens on a defined port, the port is blocked
over a special timeframe. To avoid this, the port, the server is listening on for the packets of the
measurement, must be defined at the start-up of the server. For simplification this port is the port
the server listens on for the coordination software + 1. When the server listens on port 5000 for
the coordination software then the server is accessible for an client on port 5001. The second port
of an server configuration line and the assigned server have no impact on the functionallity of the
software. They exist only to simplify the syntax of the configuration file.
Examples for configuration files:
single.conf (1 server and 1 client on 2 computers)
left1 right1 5000 5001
right1 right1 5000 5001
scenario1.conf (7 servers and 7 clients on 14 computers)
left1 right1 5000 5001
left2 right2 5000 5001
left3 right3 5000 5001
left4 right4 5000 5001
left5 right5 5000 5001
left6 right6 5000 5001
left7 right7 5000 5001
right1 right1 5000 5001
right2 right2 5000 5001
right3 right3 5000 5001
right4 right4 5000 5001
right5 right5 5000 5001
right6 right6 5000 5001
right7 right7 5000 5001
scenario1b.conf (6 servers and 6 clients on 12 computers)
left1 right1 5000 5001
left2 right2 5000 5001
left3 right3 5000 5001
left4 right4 5000 5001
left5 right5 5000 5001
left6 right6 5000 5001
right1 right1 5000 5001
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right2 right2 5000 5001
right3 right3 5000 5001
right4 right4 5000 5001
right5 right5 5000 5001
right6 right6 5000 5001
flood.conf (7 servers on 1 computer and 7 clients on 7 computers)
left1 right1 5000 5001
left2 right1 5000 5011
left3 right1 5000 5021
left4 right1 5000 5031
left5 right1 5000 5041
left6 right1 5000 5051
left7 right1 5000 5061
right1 right1 5000 5001
right1 right1 5010 5011
right1 right1 5020 5021
right1 right1 5030 5031
right1 right1 5040 5041
right1 right1 5050 5051
right1 right1 5060 5061
The protocol between througput test server, througput test client and througput test overseer
Operating sequence of a performance test:
• The user starts all the clients and servers according to the config file.
• The user starts the overseer.
• The overseer reads the config file and prepares the address structures and the test configu-
ration for all involved computers.
• The servers and clients listen on a TCP socket and wait for the configuration.
• The overseer connects to the computers via TCP and sends the configuration to them.
• The servers and clients read the configuration.
• The overseer binds a TCP socket on a port and waits now for results.
• The server is beginning to receive data over a UDP socket.
• The client is beginning to send data to the assigned server for 10 + $interval + 10 seconds
over a UDP socket.
• After 10 seconds the server takes the time; now the real measurement starts.
• After the given interval the server takes the time again; the measurement stops.
• The server receives another 10 seconds data.
• The server connects to the overseer and sends him his throughput.
• The overseer adds up all results and displays them.
• The servers and clients are now ready to receive another configuration.
• The overseer exits.
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Figure 18: Communication model for throughput tests
The 10 seconds extra data transfer before and after the real measurement is necessary to avoidma-
nipulation of the throughput by faults in the synchronisation of the different servers and clients.
3.4.1.2 A tool to measure latency
This tool consists of two parts, the client and the server. The server’s only task is to send the
received packets back as fast as possible back to the client. This is done in an easy loop (see
source code). The client’s task is to measure the round trip time. Therefore it uses the i386 CPU





• repeat this 1000 times and remember the lowest tick difference
• calculate the minimal RTT time, divide it by 2 and give it to the user
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The packet size is variable and the packets are send as UDP (to keep the overhead as small as
possible). A TCP version is also available. This is used if the firewall is under heavy load so that
UDP packets are thrown away.
To start the UDP program type ./udpserver <client ip> on the server machine and ./udpclient
<server ip> on the client machine. To start the TCP program type ./tcpserver on the server
machine and ./tcpclient <server ip> on the client machine.
To change the configuration of the test like the range of the packet size edit parameters.h .
See netgauge [http://http://www.unixer.de/ htor/stud/RA/] for the source code.
3.4.1.3 Connection test - a tool for counting the possible number of connections
Each connection through the firewall wastes a small amount of system memory on the firewall
system. It is to be expected that the performance of the firewall depends on the number of simul-
taneous connections.
This tool contains a server and a client. The client should generate a variable number of TCP
connections to the server. The server accepts the connections and then both partners should do
nothing. This is necessary to avoid impact on the other measurements. Since a single process can
only hold 1024 connection (file descriptors), there must be one process per 1000 connections on
the server side and on the client side. How the processes are created and how they act among
each other is pictured in figure 19.
Figure 19: Communication model for communication tests
Connection test server - a server to create a lot of connections
The server should accept a specified number of connections. There must be one process per 1000
connections. The server process duplicates itself each 1000 connections with the use of the system
call fork().
Input variables:
• Port the server listens on.
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• Number of maximal accepted connections.
To start the program type ./connection test server <start port> <number of connections> on the
server machine.
Connection test client - a client to create a lot of connections
The client should establish a specified number of TCP connections to the server. The client du-
plicates itself each 1000 connections with the use of the system call fork(). When he established
all required connections the user can close all the connections by pressing a key. The client ter-
minates now. The client stops establishing new connections if the limit of open file descriptors of
the operating system is reached or if all connections are established the user has entered.
Input variables:
• Number of connections the client should establish.
• Server IP.
• Server port.
To start the program type ./connection test client<server name><start port><number of connections>
on the client machine.
3.4.2 Software for security measurements
3.4.2.1 Nessus
Nessus [http://www.nessus.org] is a powerful, up-to-date and easy to use remote security scan-
ner. It is able to audit remotely a given network and determine whether there are security issues
that could lead to misuse in some way.
3.4.2.2 Sara
Sara [http://www-arc.com/sara/] (Security Auditor’s Research Assistant), derived from SA-
TAN (Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks), scans remotely systems via the net-
work. Like Nessus it is able to determine whether there are security issues that could lead to
misuse in some way.
3.4.2.3 Nmap
Nmap [http://www.insecure.org/nmap/] is a free open source utility for network exploration or
security auditing. It was designed to scan rapidly large networks, although it works fine against
single hosts. Nmap uses raw IP packets in novel ways to determine which hosts are available
on the network, which services (application name and version) those hosts are offering, which
operating systems (and OS versions) they are running, which type of packet filters/firewalls are
in use, and dozens of other characteristics. Nmap runs on most types of computers and both
console and graphical versions are available.
3.4.2.4 The landattack packet generator
The landattack packet generator generates packets suitable for simulating a land attack. It gen-
erates as fast as possible packets with identical source and destination IP addresses and identical
source and destination port. The target IP address can be given by command line argument and
the source and destination ports are random. The tool prints bandwidth statistics every 10 sec-
onds to the console.
See attachments for the source code.
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3.4.2.5 The synflood packet generator
The synflood packet generator generates packets for a simulated SYN flood attack. The packets
have a random source port and a random IP address. They are sent to a target given per command
line.
See attachments for the source code.
3.4.2.6 The WinNuke packet generator
The WinNuke [http://www.computec.ch/software/denial of service/winnuke/winnuke.zip] at-
tack tool is available as Windows and Linux application. For the tests the Linux version is chosen.
In the default configuration the WinNuke attack attacks the SMB service (port 139) on the target
machine. Since the available Linux clients do not listen on port 139, the code was modified so that
it attacks the SSH daemon on port 22.
See attachments for the source code.
3.4.2.7 Hping2
Hping2 is a handy tool and best described by the author himself. Extract from the Hping home-
page [http://www.hping.org]: ”hping is a command-line oriented TCP/IP packet assembler/an-
alyzer. The interface is inspired to the ping(8) unix command, but hping isn’t only able to send
ICMP echo requests. It supports TCP, UDP, ICMP and RAW-IP protocols, has a traceroute mode,
the ability to send files between a covered channel, and many other features.”. A copy can be be
downloaded from the website.
3.4.2.8 Frag
The frag tool generates ICMP echo requests with a defineable MTU value. It can fragment every
packet into fragments of arbitrary size. It is only an alternative to hping2, because the ICMP code
in hping2 is broken (it generates broken fragments).
3.4.2.9 Arpspoof
Arpspoof is a part of the dsniff package, a collection of tools to perform security audits. Further
documentation and the code can be found at the Dsniff homepage [http://naughty.monkey.org/ dug-
song/dsniff/].
3.5 Rulesets for the firewalls
This section explains which rulesets are why used for the tests and how they are translated ac-
cording to the special firewall software.
In section 3.5.1 the rulesets are described in pseudo language so that they are adaptable to the
individual firewall systems. Section 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.5.4, 3.5.5 and 3.5.6 then describe how the rulesets
have to look like or how the rulesets have to be generated for the individual firewalls.
3.5.1 Abstract rulesets
In this chapter, some rulesets are describedwhich are used for the tests. Each ruleset is customised
for a group of tests. It is assumed that the firewall checks the ruleset with a first match strategy.
If no entry matches, the default policy is carried out. This default policy can be accept or deny.
As described in section 3, the available computers are divided in two groups called left and right.
Each computer in such a group has a name like left1 to left7 or right1 to right7. To apply a rule to
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a hole group of computers left* and right* can be used. For the performance test an easy client-
server software was written (described in section 3.4.1). To ensure that the test software is allowed
to connect through the firewall, a rule has to be added in the rulesets with default deny policy.
This rule must be placed at the end of the ruleset to guarantee that the rule matches in the last
moment of the check. Otherwise, tests concerning the size of the rulesets would be senseless. For
this client-server software a range of ports must be unlocked.
3.5.1.1 Ruleset 1
In this ruleset the firewall accepts all the traffic. This is important for example to perform perfor-
mance tests.
• allow every packet
List 34: Abstract ruleset 1
3.5.1.2 Ruleset 2
In this case, the firewall blocks every packet.
• deny and log every packet
List 35: Abstract ruleset 2
3.5.1.3 Ruleset 3
All the traffic is accepted and NAT/PAT has to be activated here. This ruleset is used for perfor-
mance tests with activated NAT/PAT.
• Activate NAT/PAT from left* to right*.
• Forward port 5001 tcp to left1 (required for throughput tool).
• Forward port 5000 udp to left1 (required for latency tool).
• Allow every packet.
List 36: Abstract ruleset 3
3.5.1.4 Ruleset 4
All the traffic is accepted, fragmented packets will be reassembled and stateful firewalling is en-
abled here. This ruleset is used for performance and security tests with activated stateful fire-
walling.
• Allow stateful HTTP from left* to right*.
• Allow stateful DNS from left* to right1.
• Allow stateful SSH from right* to left1.
• Allow stateful TCP ECHO from right* to left*.
• Allow stateful TEST PROTOCOL from left* to right*.
• Allow stateful TEST PROTOCOL from right* to left*.
• Deny and log every packet.
List 37: Abstract ruleset 4
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3.5.1.5 Ruleset 5
This ruleset should represent a typical configuration of a firewall in a small company. The struc-
ture of the assumed network you can see in figure 20.
• Allow all ICMP from left* to right*.
• Allow all ICMP from right* to left*.
• Allow stateful DNS from left* to right{1,2,3}.
• Allow stateful HTTP from left* to right*.
• Allow stateful HTTP from right* to left{1,2,3}.
• Allow stateful SMTP from left{6,7} to right*.
• Allow stateful SMTP from right* to left{6,7}.
• Allow stateful SSH from left* to right*.
• Allow stateful SSH from right* to left{1,2,3,4,5}.
• Allow TEST PROTOCOL from left* to right*.
• Allow TEST PROTOCOL from right* to left*.
• Deny and log every packet.
List 38: Abstract ruleset 5
Figure 20: Visualisation of ruleset 5
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3.5.1.6 Ruleset 6
For some tests it is recommended that the firewall has a very large ruleset. The loop in the ruleset
unlocks step by step a port larger 20000 of a special private computer for TCP and UDP traffic
from public computers. The ruleset will be implemented as a script which generates the concrete
ruleset with a dynamic loop parameter called <aNumber>. This parameter will vary whichever
the results of a firewall will be interesting.
• $port = 1
$currentLoop = 1
$maximumLoops = <aNumber>
foreach $currentLoop in 1..$maximumLoops do
foreach $number in 1..7 do
allow TCP&UDP from right* to left[$number] over port (20000+$port)
port += 1
• Allow TEST PROTOCOL from left* to right*.
• Allow TEST PROTOCOL from right* to left*.
• Deny and log every packet.
List 39: Abstract ruleset 6
3.5.1.7 Ruleset 7
To test aspects of the firewall depending on the level of logging the following ruleset was created.
It is possible to adjust the level to eight different values in {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. It describes the
number of computers involved in logging. The ruleset will be implemented as a script which
generates the concrete ruleset with the dynamic level parameter called <aNumber>.
• $level = <aNumber>
foreach $number in 1..7 do
if $number > $level
allow TCP&UDP from left[$number] to right*
else
allow and log TCP&UDP from left[$number] to right*
• Allow TCP&UDP from right* to left*.
• Deny and log every packet.
List 40: Abstract ruleset 7
3.5.2 Rulesets for Packetfilter
Packetfilter reads its configuration rules by default from /etc/pf.conf at boot time. This file will be
loaded and interpreted by pfctl and inserted into pf . For some applications, other rulesets may
be loaded from other files after boot.
A Packetfilter configuration file has seven parts:
• Macros: Definition of user-defined variables that can hold IP addresses, interface names,
etc.
• Tables: Definition of tables used to hold lists of IP addresses
• Options: Various options to control how Packetfilter works
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• Scrub: Reprocessing packets to normalize and defragment them
• Queueing: Definition of Traffic Management
• Translation: Definition of NAT, PAT and redirection
• Filtering: Definition of rules performed on packets
List 41: Parts of the Packetfilter configuration file
With the exception of macros and tables, each section should appear in this order in the configu-
ration file, though not all sections have to exist for any particular application.
Blank lines are ignored, and lines beginning with # are treated as comments.
Filter rules specify the criteria that a packet must match and the resulting action, either deny or
allow, that is taken when a match is found. Packetfilter evaluates filter rules in a sequential order,
first to last. Unless the packet matches a rule containing the quick keyword, the packet will be
evaluated against all filter rules before the final action is taken. The last rule to match will be
taken and will dictate which action to take on the packet. There is an implicit deny all or allow all
at the beginning of a filtering ruleset meaning that if a packet does not match any filter rule the
resulting action will be deny or allow.
3.5.2.1 Ruleset 1
This is the realisation of the first ruleset 3.5.1.1 defined on page 62. In this configuration the





This is the realisation of the second ruleset 3.5.1.2 defined on page 62. In this configuration the





This is the realisation of the third ruleset 3.5.1.3 defined on page 62. In this configuration the







nat on $right_if \
from $left_if:network to $right_if:network -> ($right_if)
rdr on $right_if proto tcp \
from any to any \
port 5001 -> 192.168.100.1 port 5001
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table <allLeft> {192.168.100.0/29 !192.168.100.0}
table <allRight> {192.168.101.0/29 !192.168.101.0}
table <dnsServerRight> {192.168.101.1}
##########
# Options (as needed for the tests):
set limit states 400000
##########






pass in quick on $left_if proto tcp \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port 80 keep state
pass out quick on $right_if proto tcp \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port 80 keep state
# DNS
pass in quick on $left_if proto udp \
from <allLeft> to <dnsServerRight> port 53 keep state
pass out quick on $right_if proto udp \
from <allLeft> to <dnsServerRight> port 53 keep state
# SSH
pass in quick on $right_if proto tcp \
from <allRight> to $left1 port 22 keep state
pass out quick on $left_if proto tcp \
from <allRight> to $left1 port 22 keep state
# ECHO
pass in quick on $right_if proto tcp \
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from <allRight> to <allLeft> port 7 keep state
pass out quick on $left_if proto tcp \
from <allRight> to <allLeft> port 7 keep state
# TEST_PROTOCOL STATEFUL
pass in quick on $left_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port $test_ports keep state
pass out quick on $right_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port $test_ports keep state
pass in quick on $right_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> to <allLeft> port $test_ports keep state
pass out quick on $left_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> to <allLeft> port $test_ports keep state
3.5.2.5 Ruleset 5








table <allLeft> {192.168.100.0/29 !192.168.100.0}
table <allRight> {192.168.101.0/29 !192.168.101.0}
table <dnsServerRight> {192.168.101.1 192.168.101.2 192.168.101.3}
table <httpServerLeft> {192.168.100.1 192.168.100.2 192.168.100.3}
table <smtpServerLeft> {192.168.100.6 192.168.100.7}
table <sshLeftDenied> {192.168.100.6 192.168.100.7}










pass quick proto icmp from <allLeft> to <allRight>
pass quick proto icmp from <allRight> to <allLeft>
# DNS
pass in quick on $left_if proto udp \
from <allLeft> to <dnsServerRight> port 53 keep state
pass out quick on $right_if proto udp \
from <allLeft> to <dnsServerRight> port 53 keep state
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# HTTP
pass in quick on $left_if proto tcp \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port 80 keep state
pass out quick on $right_if proto tcp \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port 80 keep state
pass in quick on $right_if proto tcp \
from <allRight> to <httpServerLeft> port 80 keep state
pass out quick on $left_if proto tcp \
from <allRight> to <httpServerLeft> port 80 keep state
# SMTP
pass in quick on $left_if proto tcp \
from <smtpServerLeft> to <allRight> port 25 keep state
pass out quick on $right_if proto tcp \
from <smtpServerLeft> to <allRight> port 25 keep state
pass in quick on $right_if proto tcp \
from <allRight> to <smtpServerLeft> port 25 keep state
pass out quick on $left_if proto tcp \
from <allRight> to <smtpServerLeft> port 25 keep state
# SSH
pass in quick on $left_if proto tcp \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port 22 keep state
pass out quick on $right_if proto tcp \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port 22 keep state
pass in quick on $right_if proto tcp \
from <allRight> to <sshLeftAllowed> port 22 keep state
pass out quick on $left_if proto tcp \
from <allRight> to <sshLeftAllowed> port 22 keep state
# TEST_PROTOCOL STATELESS
pass in quick on $left_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port $test_ports
pass out quick on $right_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port $test_ports
pass in quick on $right_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> to <allLeft> port $test_ports
pass out quick on $left_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> to <allLeft> port $test_ports
pass in quick on $left_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allLeft> port $test_ports to <allRight>
pass out quick on $right_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allLeft> port $test_ports to <allRight>
pass in quick on $right_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> port $test_ports to <allLeft>
pass out quick on $left_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> port $test_ports to <allLeft>
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3.5.2.6 Ruleset 6
This is the realisation of the sixth ruleset 3.5.1.6 defined on page 64 as shellscript which generates
the appropriate config file.
#!/bin/sh
confile="pf-6.conf"








table <allLeft> {192.168.100.0/29 !192.168.100.0}
table <allRight> {192.168.101.0/29 !192.168.101.0}
##########






pass in quick on $left_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port $test_ports
pass out quick on $right_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allLeft> to <allRight> port $test_ports
pass in quick on $right_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> to <allLeft> port $test_ports
pass out quick on $left_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> to <allLeft> port $test_ports
pass in quick on $left_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allLeft> port $test_ports to <allRight>
pass out quick on $right_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allLeft> port $test_ports to <allRight>
pass in quick on $right_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> port $test_ports to <allLeft>
pass out quick on $left_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> port $test_ports to <allLeft>





let maximumLoops=maximumLoops/2 > /dev/null
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while [ $currentLoop -le $maximumLoops ]; do
for number in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7;do
let temp=20000+port > /dev/null
echo "pass in on \$right_if proto {tcp udp} \\" >> ${confile}
echo " from <allRight> to 192.168.100.${number} port ${temp}" >> ${confile}
echo "pass out on \$left_if proto {tcp udp} \\" >> ${confile}
echo " from <allRight> to 192.168.100.${number} port ${temp}" >> ${confile}
let port=port+1 > /dev/null
done
let currentLoop=currentLoop+1 > /dev/null
done
3.5.2.7 Ruleset 7
This is the realisation of the seventh ruleset 3.5.1.7 defined on page 64 as shellscript which gener-
ates the appropriate config file.
#!/bin/sh
confile="pf-7.conf"







table <allLeft> {192.168.100.0/29 !192.168.100.0}
table <allRight> {192.168.101.0/29 !192.168.101.0}
##########





pass in on $right_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> to <allLeft>
pass out on $left_if proto {tcp udp} \
from <allRight> to <allLeft>
# GENERATED BY LOOP
END
level=$1
for number in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7;do
if [ $number -gt $level ]; then
echo "pass in on \$left_if proto {tcp udp} \\" >> ${confile}
echo " from 192.168.100.${number} to <allRight>" >> ${confile}
echo "pass out on \$right_if proto {tcp udp} \\" >> ${confile}
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echo " from 192.168.100.${number} to <allRight>" >> ${confile}
else
echo "pass in log on \$left_if proto {tcp udp} \\" >> ${confile}
echo " from 192.168.100.${number} to <allRight>" >> ${confile}
echo "pass out on \$right_if proto {tcp udp} \\" >> ${confile}
echo " from 192.168.100.${number} to <allRight>" >> ${confile}
fi
done
3.5.3 Rulesets for IP Tables
IP Tables is configureable by command line. A single rule can be added by every command
to the filtering table which splits into different chains. These are mainly INPUT, OUTPUT and
FORWARD. The INPUT andOUTPUT chain are evaluated for every packet received or sent by the
local kernel. The FORWARD chain is evaluated for every packet which is going to be forwarded
to other hosts. All given command sets are in bash2 syntax.
3.5.3.1 Ruleset 1
This is the realisation of the first ruleset 3.5.1.1 defined on page 62. In this configuration the
firewall allows all the traffic.
iptables -A INPUT -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -j ACCEPT
3.5.3.2 Ruleset 2
This is the realisation of the second ruleset 3.5.1.2 defined on page 62. In this configuration the
firewall blocks all the traffic.
iptables -A INPUT -j LOG
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP
iptables -A FORWARD -j LOG
iptables -A FORWARD -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -j LOG
iptables -A OUTPUT -j DROP
3.5.3.3 Ruleset 3
This is the realisation of the third ruleset 3.5.1.3 defined on page 62. In this configuration the
firewall allows all the traffic and activates PAT (by dint ofNAT) on the right interface.
iptables -A INPUT -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -j ACCEPT
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 --protocol tcp --dport 5001 -j \
DNAT --to-destination 192.168.100.4:5001
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 --protocol udp --dport 5000 -j \
DNAT --to-destination 192.168.100.1:5000
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3.5.3.4 Ruleset 4





iptables -A INPUT -i eth2 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -j LOG
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -o eth2 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -j LOG
iptables -A OUTPUT -j DROP
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHTALL} \
--destination-port 80 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHT}1 \
--destination-port 53 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFT}1 \
--destination-port 22 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFTALL} \
--destination-port 7 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -j LOG
iptables -A FORWARD -j DROP
3.5.3.5 Ruleset 5





iptables -A INPUT -i eth2 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -j LOG
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -o eth2 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -j LOG
iptables -A OUTPUT -j DROP
# ICMP
iptables -A FORWARD -p icmp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHTALL} \
-j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p icmp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFTALL} \
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-j ACCEPT
# DNS
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHT}1 \
--destination-port 53 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHT}2 \
--destination-port 53 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHT}3 \
--destination-port 53 -j ACCEPT
# HTTP
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHTALL} \
--destination-port 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFT}1 \
--destination-port 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFT}2 \
--destination-port 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFT}3 \
--destination-port 80 -j ACCEPT
# SMTP
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${LEFT}6 -d ${RIGHTALL} \
--destination-port 25 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${LEFT}7 -d ${RIGHTALL} \
--destination-port 25 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFT}6 \
--destination-port 25 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFT}7 \
--destination-port 25 -j ACCEPT
# SSH
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFT}6 \
--destination-port 22 -j DROP
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFT}7 \
--destination-port 22 -j DROP
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHTALL} \
--destination-port 22 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFTALL} \
--destination-port 22 -j ACCEPT
# TEST_PROTO
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -j ACCEPT
# established links
iptables -A FORWARD -j LOG
iptables -A FORWARD -j DROP
3.5.3.6 Ruleset 6
This is the realisation of the sixth ruleset 3.5.1.6 defined on page 64.
LEFT=192.168.100.
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iptables -A INPUT -i eth2 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -j LOG
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -o eth2 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -j LOG
iptables -A OUTPUT -j DROP
PORT=1;
for currentLoop in $(seq 1 $1); do
for number in $(seq 1 7); do
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} \
-d ${LEFT}${number} \
--destination-port $((20000+${PORT})) \
-m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${RIGHTALL} \
-d ${LEFT}${number} \
--destination-port $((20000+${PORT})) \





iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${RIGHTALL} -d ${LEFTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${LEFTALL} -d ${RIGHTALL} \
--destination-port 5000:5100 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
# established links
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -j LOG
iptables -A FORWARD -j DROP
3.5.3.7 Ruleset 7





iptables -A INPUT -i eth2 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -j LOG
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -o eth2 -j ACCEPT
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iptables -A OUTPUT -j LOG
iptables -A OUTPUT -j DROP
for number in $(seq 1 7); do
if [ $number -gt $1 ]; then
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHT}${number} \
-d ${LEFTALL} -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${RIGHT}${number} \
-d ${LEFTALL} -j ACCEPT
else
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHT}${number} \
-d ${LEFTALL} -j LOG
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s ${RIGHT}${number} \
-d ${LEFTALL} -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${RIGHT}${number} \
-d ${LEFTALL} -j LOG
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -s ${RIGHT}${number} \
-d ${LEFTALL} -j ACCEPT
fi;
done;
3.5.4 Rulesets for ISA Server
Since th ISA server does not provide the possibility to manage the firewall via command line,
each ruleset must be generated per drag and drop. The firewall configuration can be exported.
As language XML is used. This XML file is very large (around 120 pages for a simple ruleset) and
can not be included here.
When you import the firewall configuration again all rules were added to the rules which are
active in the firewall at this point of time. The rules which are already present in the active config-
uration were overwritten but rules which are active and do not exist in the firewall configuration
which is to import are not deleted. There is no possibility to delete all rules. This is a problem
because you have to delete each rule manually before you can load a new firewall configuration
to avoid the problem with resisting rules which do not belong to the new ruleset.
The ISA server has different policies where rules are stored. There is the firewall policy, the system
policy, the security policy and rules for network configuration. The rules you generate are stored
in the firewall policy. The system policy is hidden on the first look. In the system policy, there are
for example rules which allow remote access to the firewall configuration by the provided firewall
client. You are not able to delete the rules of the system policy. You can only disable them. For
the tests all the rules of the system policy were disabled. The security policy includes for example
the configuration of the intrusion detection system. The network rules describe the architecture
of the attached network. You can define for example which computers build the public and the
private network, which computers belong to a group of computers and how packets should be
routed through the interfaces.
The generation of a rule is very simple. There is a build-in wizard which asks you the necessary
things he needs to include the rule. Click in the right windows Tasks -> Create New Acess Rule
and the wizard starts.
To generate a rule you have to create a protocol object. A protocol object has a name (for example
DNS protocol), a definition of the ports and transport protocols which are used (for example
port 53 TCP and port 53 UDP) and you can define whether an application filter should examine
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the packets belonging to this protocol. The ISA server has a predefined set of the most common
protocols included.
To generate a new rule you need to know:
• A name for the rule (for example http access)
• Allow or deny
• Protocols (use one of the predefined one or create a new one)
• Source of the traffic
• Destination of the traffic
• Allowed users
After this you can define by double click on the rule if the traffic should be logged (by default
activated) and the schedule of the rule (at which time of a week should it be active).
It is not possible to differ between stateful filtering and no stateful filtering. All connections
through the firewall are handled automatically stateful.
3.5.4.1 Ruleset 1
Figure 21 shows the realisation of the first ruleset 3.5.1.1 defined on page 62. In this configuration
the firewall allows all the traffic.
Figure 21: Ruleset 1 on ISA server
The intrusion detection system is deactivated. The network rules route the traffic from the internal
to the external network and backwards.
3.5.4.2 Ruleset 2
Figure 22 shows the realisation of the second ruleset 3.5.1.2 defined on page 62. In this configura-
tion the firewall blocks all the traffic.
The intrusion detection system is activated. The network rules route the traffic from the internal
to the external network and backwards.
Torsten Ho¨fler, Christian Burkert, Martin Telzer Page 76/157
Comparative firewall study Chemnitz, 1st October 2004
Figure 22: Ruleset 2 on ISA server
3.5.4.3 Ruleset 3
Figure 23 shows the realisation of the third ruleset 3.5.1.3 defined on page 62. In this configuration
the firewall allows all the traffic.
Figure 23: Ruleset 3 on ISA server
The intrusion detection system is deactivated. The network rules route the traffic from the internal
to the external network using NAT and PAT.
3.5.4.4 Ruleset 4
Figure 24 shows the realisation of the fourth ruleset 3.5.1.4 defined on page 62.
The intrusion detection system is deactivated. The network rules route the traffic from the internal
to the external network and backwards.
3.5.4.5 Ruleset 5
Figure 25 shows the realisation of the fifth ruleset 3.5.1.5 defined on page 63. It is not possible to
allow all ICMP messages with the ISA server. You have to define a protocol object for each ICMP
type and code. These protocol object can be used to allow ICMP. In the default configuration only
ICMP type 15 code 0 (ICMP Information Request), ICMP type 13 code 0 (ICMP Timestamp) and
ICMP type 8 code 0 (Echo Request) is predefined. These 3 protocols are used as alternative for the
rule which allows all ICMP messages.
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Figure 24: Ruleset 4 on ISA server
Figure 25: Ruleset 5 on ISA server
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The intrusion detection system is deactivated. The network rules route the traffic from the internal
to the external network and backwards.
3.5.4.6 Ruleset 6
Figure 26 shows the realisation of the sixth ruleset 3.5.1.6 defined on page 64.
Since this is an abstract ruleset which generates the concret ruleset by creating rules in a loop
the XML configuration must be decomposed. Then the neccessary parts for creating rules and
protocols must be duplicated and after this the XML file must be recomposed. The recomposition
of the configuration file is done by a shell script. The script is called with the number of loops as







cat Ruleset6_top.xml > $outputfile
currentLoop=1
port=20000




sed "s/%%number1%%/${port}/g" proto1.xml > proto1.tmp.xml




sed "s/%%number2%%/${port}/g" proto1.xml > proto1.tmp.xml




sed "s/%%number3%%/${port}/g" proto1.xml > proto1.tmp.xml




sed "s/%%number4%%/${port}/g" proto1.xml > proto1.tmp.xml




sed "s/%%number5%%/${port}/g" proto1.xml > proto1.tmp.xml




sed "s/%%number6%%/${port}/g" proto1.xml > proto1.tmp.xml
sed "s/%%number6%%/${port}/g" proto2.xml > proto2.tmp.xml
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sed "s/%%number7%%/${port}/g" proto1.xml > proto1.tmp.xml
sed "s/%%number7%%/${port}/g" proto2.xml > proto2.tmp.xml
mv proto1.tmp.xml proto1.xml
mv proto2.tmp.xml proto2.xml
cat proto1.xml >> temp2.xml





cat temp1.xml >> $outputfile
cat Ruleset6_middle.xml >> $outputfile
cat temp2.xml >> $outputfile
cat Ruleset6_end.xml >> $outputfile
Figure 26: Ruleset 6 on ISA server with 2 loops
The intrusion detection system is deactivated. The network rules route the traffic from the internal
to the external network and backwards.
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3.5.4.7 Ruleset 7
Figure 27 shows the realisation of the seventh ruleset 3.5.1.7 defined on page 64. It is too circuitous
to generate a shell script which generates the XML configuration files like in ruleset 6. It is easier
to generate ruleset 7 eight times and activate or deactivate logging per hand.
Figure 27: Ruleset 7 on ISA server
The intrusion detection system is deactivated. The network rules route the traffic from the internal
to the external network and backwards.
3.5.5 Rulesets for SunScreen
It is possible to manage rulesets in two different ways. At first it is possible to manage them via
browser per drag and drop. The SunScreen firewall software offers an additional command line
interface. In this study the command line interface is used.
Creating, installing and activating a new ruleset:
ssadm policy -a ruleset_name
ssadm edit ruleset_name < configuration_file
ssadm activate rulset_name
At first some initial work has to be done. The configuration of the different subnets and the
assignment of the computers to them is done overall for all rulesets. Therefore the SunScreen
firewall offers the possibility to generate objects. There are objects for hosts, networks, protocols
(like WWW, DNS, ...) and others. This initialisation for the given test environment is done with
the following shell script.
Creating hosts and groups of hosts:
#!/bin/sh
ssadm edit Initial -c "
add address left1 HOST 192.168.100.1
add address left2 HOST 192.168.100.2
add address left3 HOST 192.168.100.3
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add address left4 HOST 192.168.100.4
add address left5 HOST 192.168.100.5
add address left6 HOST 192.168.100.6
add address left7 HOST 192.168.100.7
add address right1 HOST 192.168.101.1
add address right2 HOST 192.168.101.2
add address right3 HOST 192.168.101.3
add address right4 HOST 192.168.101.4
add address right5 HOST 192.168.101.5
add address right6 HOST 192.168.101.6
add address right7 HOST 192.168.101.7
add address firewall_intern HOST 192.168.100.254
add address firewall_extern HOST 192.168.101.254
add address left* RANGE 192.168.100.1 192.168.100.7
add address right* RANGE 192.168.101.1 192.168.101.7
add service TEST_PROTOCOL SINGLE \
FORWARD ip PORT 5000-5100 \
FORWARD tcp PORT 5000-5100 \





This is the realisation of the first ruleset 3.5.1.1 defined on page 62. In this configuration the
firewall allows all the traffic. Simply run the shell script and then call ssadm activate ruleset1 .
#!/bin/sh
ssadm policy -a ruleset1
ssadm edit ruleset1 -c "
add RULE * * * ALLOW LOG NONE





This is the realisation of the second ruleset 3.5.1.2 defined on page 62. In this configuration the
firewall blocks all the traffic. Simply run the shell script and then call ssadm activate ruleset2 .
#!/bin/sh
ssadm policy -a ruleset2
ssadm edit ruleset2 -c "
add RULE * * * DENY LOG DETAIL





This is the realisation of the third ruleset 3.5.1.3 defined on page 62. In this configuration the
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firewall allows all the traffic and actuates NAT (not PAT) on the right interface. Simply run the
shell script and then call ssadm activate ruleset3 .
#!/bin/sh
ssadm policy -a ruleset3
ssadm edit ruleset3 -c "
add RULE * * * ALLOW LOG NONE
add accesslocal USER admin PERMISSION ALL
add nat DYNAMIC e1000g1.net * firewall_extern *





This is the realisation of the fourth ruleset 3.5.1.4 defined on page 62. Simply run the shell script
and then call ssadm activate ruleset4 .
#!/bin/sh
ssadm policy -a ruleset4
ssadm edit ruleset4 -c "
add RULE "www" left* right* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "dns" left* right1 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "ssh" right* left1 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "echo" right* left* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "TEST_PROTOCOL" left* right* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "TEST_PROTOCOL" right* left* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE * * * DENY LOG DETAIL





This is the realisation of the fifth ruleset 3.5.1.5 defined on page 63. Simply run the shell script
and then call ssadm activate ruleset5 .
#!/bin/sh
ssadm policy -a ruleset5
ssadm edit ruleset5 -c "
add RULE "icmp all" left* right* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "icmp all" right* left* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "dns" left* right1 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "dns" left* right2 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "dns" left* right3 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "www" left* right* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "www" right* left1 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "www" right* left2 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "www" right* left3 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "smtp" left6 right* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "smtp" left7 right* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "smtp" right* left6 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "smtp" right* left7 ALLOW LOG NONE
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add RULE "ssh" left* right* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "ssh" right* left1 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "ssh" right* left2 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "ssh" right* left3 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "ssh" right* left4 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "ssh" right* left5 ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "TEST_PROTOCOL" left* right* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE "TEST_PROTOCOL" right* left* ALLOW LOG NONE
add RULE * * * DENY LOG DETAIL





This is the realisation of the sixth ruleset 3.5.1.6 defined on page 64. Simply run the shell script







while [ $currentLoop -le $maximumLoops ]; do
for number in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7; do
let temp=20000+port > /dev/null
#generate Prototol-object
echo "add service ${temp} SINGLE FORWARD tcp PORT ${temp} FORWARD \
udp PORT ${temp}" >> temp.temp
#generate rule
echo "add RULE ${temp} right* left${number} ALLOW LOG NONE" >> \
temp.temp




echo "add RULE \"TEST_PROTOCOL\" right* left* ALLOW LOG NONE" >> temp.temp
echo "add RULE \"TEST_PROTOCOL\" left* right* ALLOW LOG NONE" >> temp.temp
echo "add RULE * * * DENY LOG DETAIL" >> temp.temp
echo "add accesslocal USER admin PERMISSION ALL" >> temp.temp
echo "save" >> temp.temp
echo "quit" >> temp.temp
ssadm policy -a ruleset6_${maximumLoops}
ssadm edit ruleset6_${maximumLoops} < temp.temp
rm temp.temp
3.5.5.7 Ruleset 7
This is the realisation of the seventh ruleset 3.5.1.7 defined on page 64. Simply run the shell script
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for number in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7; do
if [ $number -gt $level ]; then
echo "add RULE \"TEST_PROTOCOL\" left${number} right* ALLOW LOG NONE" \
>> temp.temp
else




echo "add RULE * right* left* ALLOW LOG NONE" >> temp.temp
echo "add RULE * * * DENY LOG DETAIL" >> temp.temp
echo "add accesslocal USER admin PERMISSION ALL" >> temp.temp
echo "save" >> temp.temp
echo "quit" >> temp.temp
ssadm policy -a ruleset7_${level}
ssadm edit ruleset7_${level} < temp.temp
rm temp.temp
3.5.6 Rulesets for IP Filter
IP Filter can load two configuration files:
• Filter rules:
typically read by ipf -Fa -f <file> from /etc/ipf.rules or /usr/local/etc/ipf.rules
• Translation rules:
typically read by ipnat -CF -f <file> from /etc/ipnat.rules or /usr/local/etc/ipnat.rules
List 42: IP Filter configuration files
Blank lines in those files are ignored, and lines beginning with # are treated as comments.
Filter rules specify the criteria that a packet must match and the resulting action, either deny or
allow, that is taken when a match is found. Like Packetfilter, IP Filter evaluates filter rules in a
sequential order, first to last. Unless the packet matches a rule containing the quick keyword, the
packet will be evaluated against all filter rules before the final action is taken. The last rule to
match will be taken and will dictate which action to take on the packet. There is an implicit deny
all or allow all at the beginning of a filtering ruleset meaning that if a packet does not match any
filter rule the resulting action will be deny or allow. Despite that there should be an explicit deny
all or allow all at the beginning of a filtering ruleset to have a ruleset, independent from implicit
behaviour.
3.5.6.1 Ruleset 1
This is the realisation of the first ruleset 3.5.1.1 defined on page 62. In this configuration the




Torsten Ho¨fler, Christian Burkert, Martin Telzer Page 85/157
Comparative firewall study Chemnitz, 1st October 2004
3.5.6.2 Ruleset 2
This is the realisation of the second ruleset 3.5.1.2 defined on page 62. In this configuration the
firewall blocks all the traffic.
• Filter rules:
block in log all
block out log all
3.5.6.3 Ruleset 3
This is the realisation of the third ruleset 3.5.1.3 defined on page 62. In this configuration the






map wm0 192.168.100/24 -> 192.168.101.254/32
map wm0 192.168.100/24 -> 192.168.101.254/32 portmap tcp/udp auto
# Redirect:
rdr wm0 192.168.101.254/32 port 5000 -> 192.168.100.1 port 5000
rdr wm0 192.168.101.254/32 port 5001 -> 192.168.100.1 port 5001
3.5.6.4 Ruleset 4
This is the realisation of the fourth ruleset 3.5.1.4 defined on page 62.
• Filter rules:
block in log all
block out log all
block in log quick from 192.168.101.0/32 to any
block in log quick from any to 192.168.101.0/32
block in log quick from 192.168.100.0/32 to any
block in log quick from any to 192.168.100.0/32
# HTTP
pass in quick on wm1 proto tcp \
from 192.168.100.0/29 to 192.168.101.0/29 port = 80 keep state
pass out quick on wm0 proto tcp \
from 192.168.100.0/29 to 192.168.101.0/29 port = 80 keep state
# DNS
pass in quick on wm1 proto udp \
from 192.168.100.0/29 to 192.168.101.1/32 port = 53 keep state
pass out quick on wm0 proto udp \
from 192.168.100.0/29 to 192.168.101.1/32 port = 53 keep state
# SSH
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp \
from 192.168.101.0/29 to 192.168.100.1/32 port = 22 keep state
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pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp \
from 192.168.101.0/29 to 192.168.100.1/32 port = 22 keep state
# ECHO
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp \
from 192.168.101.0/29 to 192.168.100.0/29 port = 7 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp \
from 192.168.101.0/29 to 192.168.100.0/29 port = 7 keep state
# TEST_PROTOCOL STATEFUL
pass in quick on wm1 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101 keep state
pass out quick on wm0 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101 keep state
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101 keep state
3.5.6.5 Ruleset 5
This is the realisation of the fifth ruleset 3.5.1.5 defined on page 63.
• Filter rules:
block in log all
block out log all
block in log quick from 192.168.101.0/32 to any
block in log quick from any to 192.168.101.0/32
block in log quick from 192.168.100.0/32 to any
block in log quick from any to 192.168.100.0/32
# ICMP
pass in quick proto icmp from 192.168.100.0/29 to 192.168.101.0/29
pass in quick proto icmp from 192.168.101.0/29 to 192.168.100.0/29
# DNS
pass in quick on wm1 proto udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.1/32 port = 53 keep state
pass out quick on wm0 proto udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.1/32 port = 53 keep state
pass in quick on wm1 proto udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.2/32 port = 53 keep state
pass out quick on wm0 proto udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.2/32 port = 53 keep state
pass in quick on wm1 proto udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.3/32 port = 53 keep state
pass out quick on wm0 proto udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.3/32 port = 53 keep state
# HTTP
pass in quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port = 80 keep state
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pass out quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port = 80 keep state
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.1/32 port = 80 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.1/32 port = 80 keep state
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.2/32 port = 80 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.2/32 port = 80 keep state
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.3/32 port = 80 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.3/32 port = 80 keep state
# SMTP
pass in quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.100.6 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port = 25 keep state
pass out quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.100.6 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port = 25 keep state
pass in quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.100.7 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port = 25 keep state
pass out quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.100.7 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port = 25 keep state
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.6 port = 25 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.6 port = 25 keep state
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.7 port = 25 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.7 port = 25 keep state
# SSH
pass in quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port = 22 keep state
pass out quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port = 22 keep state
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.1/32 port = 22 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.1/32 port = 22 keep state
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.2/32 port = 22 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.2/32 port = 22 keep state
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.3/32 port = 22 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.3/32 port = 22 keep state
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pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.4/32 port = 22 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.4/32 port = 22 keep state
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.5/32 port = 22 keep state
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.5/32 port = 22 keep state
# TEST_PROTOCOL STATELESS
pass in quick on wm1 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101
pass out quick on wm0 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
to 192.168.101.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101
pass in quick on wm1 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
port 4999 >< 5101 to 192.168.101.0/29
pass out quick on wm0 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
port 4999 >< 5101 to 192.168.101.0/29
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
port 4999 >< 5101 to 192.168.100.0/29
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
port 4999 >< 5101 to 192.168.100.0/29
3.5.6.6 Ruleset 6
This is the realisation of the sixth ruleset 3.5.1.6 defined on page 64 as shell script which generates




cat << END > ${confile}
block in log all
block out log all
block in log quick from 192.168.101.0/32 to any
block in log quick from any to 192.168.101.0/32
block in log quick from 192.168.100.0/32 to any
block in log quick from any to 192.168.100.0/32
# TEST_PROTOCOL STATELESS
pass in quick on wm1 proto tcp/udp \
from 192.168.100.0/29 to 192.168.101.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101
pass out quick on wm0 proto tcp/udp \
from 192.168.100.0/29 to 192.168.101.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp/udp \
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from 192.168.101.0/29 to 192.168.100.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp/udp \
from 192.168.101.0/29 to 192.168.100.0/29 port 4999 >< 5101
pass in quick on wm1 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
port 4999 >< 5101 to 192.168.101.0/29
pass out quick on wm0 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.100.0/29 \
port 4999 >< 5101 to 192.168.101.0/29
pass in quick on wm0 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
port 4999 >< 5101 to 192.168.100.0/29
pass out quick on wm1 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
port 4999 >< 5101 to 192.168.100.0/29





while [ $currentLoop -le $maximumLoops ]; do
for number in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7;do
let temp=20000+port > /dev/null
cat << END >> ${confile}
pass in on wm0 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.${number}/32 port = ${temp}
pass out on wm1 proto tcp/udp from 192.168.101.0/29 \
to 192.168.100.${number}/32 port = ${temp}
END
let port=port+1 > /dev/null
done
let currentLoop=currentLoop+1 > /dev/null
done
3.5.6.7 Ruleset 7
This is the realisation of the seventh ruleset 3.5.1.7 defined on page 64 as shell script which gen-




cat << END > ${confile}
block in log all
block out log all
block in log quick from 192.168.101.0/32 to any
block in log quick from any to 192.168.101.0/32
block in log quick from 192.168.100.0/32 to any
block in log quick from any to 192.168.100.0/32
pass in on wm0 proto tcp/udp \
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from 192.168.101.0/29 to 192.168.100.0/29
pass out on wm1 proto tcp/udp \
from 192.168.101.0/29 to 192.168.100.0/29
# GENERATED BY LOOP
END
level=$1
for number in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7;do
if [ $number -gt $level ]; then
cat << END >> ${confile}
pass in on wm1 proto tcp/udp \
from 192.168.100.${number}/32 to 192.168.101.0/29
pass out on wm0 proto tcp/udp \
from 192.168.100.${number}/32 to 192.168.101.0/29
END
else
cat << END >> ${confile}
pass in log on wm1 proto tcp/udp \
from 192.168.100.${number}/32 to 192.168.101.0/29
pass out on wm0 proto tcp/udp \





The available computers are divided in a private and a public network. Between the network
the firewall system works as node which connects the two networks. The computers of the pri-
vate network get addresses out of the address space 192.168.100/24 and a name in the form
left<number>. The computers of the public network get addresses out of the address space
192.168.101/24 and a name in the form right<number>.
3.6.1 Scenario 1
This scenario uses the full technical equipment which is available. You can see the structure of
the scenario in figure 28.
Seven of the available computers should build a public subnet (right computers) and seven should
build the private subnet (left computers). With the use of the two one gigabit switches, each seven
computers could be connected in form of a star. The remaining computer should be the firewall
system. One of the left computers should monitor the firewall system with the help of its 100
MBit interface.
This scenario is used to perform throughput tests, tests concerning the maximum number of
connections and security tests.
3.6.2 Scenario 2
This scenario is required for latency tests. One of the left computers, one of the right computers,
the two switches and the firewall system are used. One of the left computers should monitor the
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Figure 28: Layout of scenario 1
firewall system through its 100 MBit interface. You can see the structure in figure 29.
Figure 29: Layout of scenario 2
3.6.3 Scenario 3
In this scenario only one computer in the private subnet (left computers) and the firewall system
are required. With this layout, the tests concerning remote management and the secure path can
be performed. Each available computer has an 100 MBit interface. This interface can be used to
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build up a secure management network which is totally separated from the rest of the network.
You can see the structure in figure 30.
Figure 30: Layout of scenario 3
3.6.4 Scenario 4
This is the simplest scenario. Only the firewall system is participated. This layout is used for
example to perform tests concerning usability. You can see the structure in figure 31.
Figure 31: Layout of scenario 4
3.6.5 Scenario 5
This scenario uses all available computers. You can see the structure of the scenario in figure 32.
It is used to measure the maximum throughput through the wire.
All computers are arranged in the same address space 192.168.101/24. Since only two 8-port
switches are available seven computers are connected to each switch and the two switches are
connected directly with each other through the uplink ports. The firewall system is not used. The
performance should be measured on the wire between the two switches.
3.6.6 Scenario 6
This scenario uses eight computers. You can see the structure of the scenario in figure 33. It is
used to measure the maximum throughput of a single computer.
All computers are arranged in the same address space 192.168.101/24. They are all connected by
one switch. The firewall system is not used.
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Figure 32: Layout of scenario 5
Figure 33: Layout of scenario 6
Torsten Ho¨fler, Christian Burkert, Martin Telzer Page 94/157
Comparative firewall study Chemnitz, 1st October 2004
3.7 Timeline
The timeline for choosing the newest stable firewall software version ended at 31.05.2004.
Our research led us to the following versions of the firewall systems:
System Hardware Firewall Version Operating System Version
A Computer 1 Packetfilter Part of OpenBSD OpenBSD 3.5
B Comouter 1 IP Tables 1.2.9 Linux 2.6.6
C Computer 1 MS ISA Server ISA 2004 Beta 2 MS Windows 2003 Server
D Computer 2 Sunscreen v3.2 Solaris 9 4/04
E Computer 1 IP Filter 3.4.29 NetBSD 1.6.2
Table 4: Used firewall systems - versions
System D was tested on computer 2 because it was not possible to get the network interfaces
working under Solaris on computer 1.
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4 Methodology
This chapter describes how each test is performed in detail and how the results are calculated
to a final rating. All aspects of the requirements are tested. The results of the tests are collected
in tables. This chapter shows the templates for this tables, which are later used in the execution
phase. The tests are devided in tests to general requirements, tests for optional features, tests
concerning rulesets, security, usability and performance. Each of this test chapters generates a
partial result. The entire rating of the firewall is then calculated with the following formula:
pfirewall =
pgeneral + pfeatures + pruleset + psecurity + pusability + pperformance
6
4.1 General requirements
The comparison of general requirements of the different firewall systems is mainly based on the
appropriate documentation and the collected experiences during the execution of the tests. An
auxiliary comment contributes to the appreciation.
Rating: The result of this discipline is called pgeneral. For each rgenerali is set to 2. For each
rgenerali is set to 1 and for rgenerali is set to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall
can reach in this discipline is 10. This value represents 100%. pgeneral1 is then calculated with the
following formula:
pgeneral =




Test: Every traffic must go through the firewall
Result rgeneral1
Comments The firewall gets a if all traffic between two networks goes through
the firewall.
Test: Every traffic that is not explicitly allowed has to be denied
Result rgeneral2
Comments The firewall gets a if all traffic will be denied in the default configu-
ration.
Test: Administration of the firewall must only be possible through a secure path
Result rgeneral3
Comments The firewall gets a if there is no insecure way to administer the fire-
wall.
Test: The firewall itself must be resistant against attacks
Result rgeneral4
Comments The firewall gets a if it fends the security tests on it.
Test: The firewall must be resistent against failure
Result rgeneral5
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Comments The firewall gets a if it is stable during all tests.
Table 5: Template - general requirements
4.2 Optional features
The comparison of optional features of the different firewall systems is mainly based on the ap-
propriate documentation and the collected experiences during the execution of the tests. An
auxiliary comment contributes to the appreciation.
Rating: The result of this discipline is called pfeatures. For each rfeaturesi is set to 2. For each
rfeaturesi is set to 1 and for rfeaturesi is set to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall
can reach in this discipline is 20. This value represents 100%. pfeatures1 is then calculated with the
following formula:
pfeatures =




Test: Support for application filters and proxies
Result rfeatures1
Comments The firewall gets a if there is support by included or it gets if there
is support by third-party application filters and proxies.
Test: Support for network and port address translation
Result rfeatures2
Comments The firewall gets a if there is included support for NAT and PAT.
Test: Support for virtual private networks
Result rfeatures3
Comments The firewall gets a if there is included support or support by the
operating system for VPN or it gets a if there is support by third-
party tools.
Test: Support for user authentication
Result rfeatures4
Comments The firewall gets a if there is support for user authentication on the
firewall with included tools or it gets if there is support by third-
party tools.
Test: Support for address aliasing
Result rfeatures5
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to assign multiple addresses to
one interface and if it is possible to filter on these virtual interfaces.
Test: Support for time based filtering
Result rfeatures6
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Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to filter packets differently at dif-
ferent times with included tools or it gets if it is possible with third-
party tools.
Test: Support for embedded antivirus
Result rfeatures7
Comments The firewall gets a if there is included support for antivirus software
or support by the operating system or it gets if there is support by
third-party tools.
Test: Support for URL filtering
Result rfeatures8
Comments The firewall gets a if there is included support for URL filtering or
support by the operating system or it gets if there is support by
third-party tools.
Test: Support for traffic management
Result rfeatures9
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to prioritise and load balance traffic
with included tools or by the operating system or it gets if traffic
management is supported by third-party tools.
Test: Support for demilitarised zones
Result rfeatures10
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to handle additional zones with
different permissions.
Table 6: Template - optional features
4.3 Rulesets and its configuration
The comparison of ruleset requirements is mainly based on the appropriate documentation and
the collected experiences during the conversion of the abstract rulesets in section 3.5 at page 61 to
the implementation of the corresponding firewall system. An auxiliary comment contributes to
the appreciation.
Rating: The tests concerning the ruleset are divided into four parts. The entire result (pruleset) is
the average value of this four partial results and is calculated with the following formula:
pruleset = 0.25 ∗ pruleset1 + 0.15 ∗ pruleset2 + 0.3 ∗ pruleset3 + 0.3 ∗ pruleset4
The weighting is based on subjective experience.
4.3.1 General aspects
Rating: For each rruleset1i is set to 2. For each rruleset1i is set to 1 and for rruleset1i is set
to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 24. This value
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represents 100%. pruleset1 is then calculated with the following formula:
pruleset1 =






Comments The firewall gets a if allow is supported.
Test: Deny and reject
Result rruleset12
Comments The firewall gets a if deny and reject is supported.
Test: Deny and drop
Result rruleset13
Comments The firewall gets a if deny and drop is supported.
Test: Translate (NAT, PAT)
Result rruleset14
Comments The firewall gets a if translate is supported.
Test: Defragment
Result rruleset15
Comments The firewall gets a if defragment is supported.
Test: Log
Result rruleset16
Comments The firewall gets a if log is supported.
Table 7: Template - rulesets - actions on packets
Number: III/II
System: X
Test: Evaluate the unchanged ruleset in a specified order
Result rruleset17
Comments The firewall gets a if it does not change a loaded ruleset and evalu-
ates packets against the rules in a specified order.
Test: Test the syntax of the ruleset on integrity and contradiction in terms
Result rruleset18
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to find syntactical errors.
Test: Test the semantics of the ruleset on integrity and contradiction in terms
Result rruleset19
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to find semantical errors.
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Test: Define a ruleset in a language with a specified grammar
Result rruleset110
Comments The firewall gets a if the documentation includes a specified gram-
mar (for example in BNF).
Test: Handling of default rules
Result rruleset111
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to define rules which handle pack-
ets not matched by other rules.
Test: Actuate stateful inspection
Result rruleset112
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to handle states.
Table 8: Template - ruleset requirements
4.3.2 Subnet layer (OSI layer 2)
The following templates apply to the requirements on the subnet layer.
Rating: For each rruleset2i is set to 2. For each rruleset2i is set to 1 and for rruleset2i is set
to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 16. This value
represents 100%. pruleset2 is then calculated with the following formula:
pruleset2 =




Test: Act by means of the affected interface
Result rruleset21
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to filter by the affected interface.
Test: Act by means of incoming or outgoing packets
Result rruleset22
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to filter by the direction of packets.
Test: Act by means of fields of Ethernet
Result rruleset23
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to filter Ethernet.
Test: Act by means of other network technologies
Result rruleset24
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to filter other network technologies
beside Ethernet on subnet layer.
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Table 9: Template - rulesets - subnet layer
Number: III/IV
System: X
Test: Ethernet address of destination
Result rruleset25
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to filter by the Ethernet address of the
destination .
Test: Ethernet address of sender
Result rruleset26








Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the checksum .
Table 10: Template - rulesets - subnet layer - fields of Ethernet
4.3.3 Internet layer (OSI layer 3)
The following templates apply to requirements on the internet layer.
Rating: For each rruleset3i is set to 2. For each rruleset3i is set to 1 and for rruleset3i is set
to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 106. This value
represents 100%. pruleset3 is then calculated with the following formula:
pruleset3 =




Test: Act by means of fields of IPv4
Result rruleset31
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to filter IPv4.
Test: Act by means of fields of ICMPv4
Result rruleset32
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to filter ICMPv4.
Test: Act by means of fields of IPv6
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Result rruleset33
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to filter IPv6.
Test: Act by means of fields of ICMPv6
Result rruleset34
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to filter ICMPv6.
Test: Act by means of other network technologies
Result rruleset35
Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to filter other network technologies on
internet layer.





Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the version field from
the ruleset.
Test: Internet header length
Result rruleset37
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the internet header length
field from the ruleset.
Test: Type of service
Result rruleset38








Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the identification field
from the ruleset.
Test: May/don’t fragment flag
Result rruleset311
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the may/don’t fragment
flag from the ruleset.
Test: Last/more fragment flag
Result rruleset312
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Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the last/more fragment
flag from the ruleset.
Test: Fragment offset
Result rruleset313
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the fragment offset field
from the ruleset.
Test: Time to live
Result rruleset314








Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the header checksum .
Test: Source address
Result rruleset317




Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the destination address
field from the ruleset.
Test: Options
Result rruleset319
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the options field from
the ruleset.
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Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to examine the ICMP checksum.
Table 13: Template - rulesets - internet layer - fields of ICMPv4
Number: III/VIII
System: X
Test: 0 - Echo reply
Result rruleset323
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMP type 0 from the
ruleset.
Test: 3 - Destination unreachable
Result rruleset324
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMP type 3 from the
ruleset.
Test: 4 - Source quench
Result rruleset325
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMP type 4 from the
ruleset.
Test: 5 - Redirect
Result rruleset326
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMP type 5 from the
ruleset.
Test: 8 - Echo
Result rruleset327
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMP type 8 from the
ruleset.
Test: 11 - Time exceeded
Result rruleset328
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMP type 11 from the
ruleset.
Test: 12 - Parameter problem
Result rruleset329
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMP type 12 from the
ruleset.
Test: 13 - Timestamp
Result rruleset330
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Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMP type 13 from the
ruleset.
Test: 14 - Timestamp reply
Result rruleset331i
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMP type 14 from the
ruleset.
Test: 15 - Information request
Result rruleset332
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMP type 15 from the
ruleset.
Test: 16 - Information reply
Result rruleset333
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMP type 16 from the
ruleset.
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Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the destination address
field from the ruleset.













Comments The firewall gets a if it is able to examine the ICMPv6 checksum.
Table 16: Template - rulesets - internet layer - fields of ICMPv6
Number: III/XI
System: X
Test: 1 - Destination unreachable
Result rruleset345
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMPv6 type 1 from
the ruleset.
Test: 2 - Packet too big
Result rruleset346
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMPv6 type 2 from
the ruleset.
Test: 3 - Time exceeded
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Result rruleset347
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMPv6 type 3 from
the ruleset.
Test: 4 - Parameter problem
Result rruleset348
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMPv6 type 4 from
the ruleset.
Test: 128 - Echo request
Result rruleset349
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMPv6 type 128 from
the ruleset.
Test: 129 - Echo reply
Result rruleset350
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMPv6 type 129 from
the ruleset.
Test: 130 - Group membership query
Result rruleset351
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMPv6 type 130 from
the ruleset.
Test: 131 - Group membership report
Result rruleset352
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMPv6 type 131 from
the ruleset.
Test: 132 - Group membership reduction
Result rruleset353
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine ICMPv6 type 132 from
the ruleset.
Table 17: Template - rulesets - internet layer - types of ICMPv6
4.3.4 Transport layer (OSI layer 4)
The following templates apply to requirements on the transport layer. The fields and flags of TCP
and UDPwill be tested.
Rating: For each rruleset4i is set to 2. For each rruleset4i is set to 1 and for rruleset4i is set
to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 42. This value
represents 100%. pruleset4 is then calculated with the following formula:
pruleset4 =
100 · ∑21i=1 rruleset4i
42
Number: III/XII
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Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the sequence number
field from the ruleset.
Test: Acknowledgment number
Result rruleset44
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the acknowledgment
number field from the ruleset.
Test: Data offset
Result rruleset45
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the data offset field
from the ruleset.
Test: Bit 101 - Bit 106 (reserved)
Result rruleset46
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the reserved bits of
TCP from the ruleset.
Test: URG: Urgent Pointer field significant
Result rruleset47
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the URG flag from the
ruleset.
Test: ACK: Acknowledgment field significant
Result rruleset48
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the ACK flag from the
ruleset.
Test: PSH: Push function
Result rruleset49
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the PSH flag from the
ruleset.
Test: RST: Reset the connection
Result rruleset410
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Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine theRST flag from the
ruleset.
Test: SYN: Synchronise sequence numbers
Result rruleset411
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the SYN flag from the
ruleset.
Test: FIN: No more data from sender
Result rruleset412




















Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the padding from the
ruleset.
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Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to examine the checksum .
Table 19: Template - rulesets - transport layer - fields of UDP
4.4 Security and its configuration
In this chapter every security feature named in sections 2 on page 23 will be tested separately.
If the firewall does not offer this feature by default, we will try to reconfigure it to achieve the
described result. The effort for reconfiguring and the security of standard rules will be evaluated
in this study. Every item without todo-list is investigated by the documentation of the firewall.
Rating: The result of this discipline is called psecurity . psecurity is calculated with the following
formula:
psecurity = 0.2 ∗ psecurity1 + 0.1 ∗ psecurity2 + 0.1 ∗ psecurity3 + 0.1 ∗ psecurity4+
0.2 ∗ psecurity5 + 0.1 ∗ psecurity6 + 0.2 ∗ psecurity7
The weighting is based on subjective experience.
4.4.1 Access to the firewall
Rating: For each rsecurity1i is set to 2. For each rsecurity1i is set to 1 and for rsecurity1i is
set to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 8. This value
represents 100%. psecurity1 is then calculated with the following formula:
psecurity1 =
100 · ∑4i=1 rsecurity1i
8
4.4.1.1 Access must only be granted through a secure path
How is the administrative access path defined? Is it possible to use (only) a secure path (for
example VLAN, Null-Modem, seperate network) to administer the firewall services?
If not already available, a secure path will be installed, and the expense for all related actions will
be measured.
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4.4.1.2 User authentication must happen with strong encryption
How is the user authentication organised? Does the system offer protocols with strong encryption
to change the settings and to administrate the firewall service? Are the passwords stored in a
secure manner?
If not already available, strong authentication will be enabled, and the expense for all related
actions will be measured.
4.4.1.3 The role of a reviser must be offered
Is there a special user role for a reviser?
A reviser role will be introduced if the system does not offer it by default.
4.4.1.4 Access to the system must be logged
Will every access to the system be logged?
Full logging will be enabled for every action (login to the management console, change of firewall
rules, change of roles)
4.4.1.5 Evaluation table template
Number: IV/I
System: X
Test: Access must only be granted through a secure path
Result rsecurity11
Comments
Test: User authentication must happen with strong encryption
Result rsecurity12
Comments
Test: The role of a reviser must be offered
Result rsecurity13
Comments
Test: Access to the system must be logged
Result rsecurity14
Comments
Table 20: Template - security - access
4.4.2 Hardening the operating system
Rating: For a rsecurity2 is set to 2. For a rsecurity2 is set to 1 and for rsecurity2 is set to 0. The
maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 2. This value represents
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4.4.2.1 The firewall should only depend on necessary software
Are only necessary components installed or also other software which brings out a potential secu-
rity hole? Also useful stuff for intruders for example compilers, editors ... should not be installed.
The installation is performed minimalised or a standard installation will be minimised. Is it pos-
sible, and how big is the effort?
4.4.2.2 Evaluation table template
Number: IV/II
System: X
Test: The firewall should only depend on necessary software
Result rsecurity2
Comments
Table 21: Template - security - operating system
4.4.3 Selftests
Rating: For each rsecurity3i is set to 2. For each rsecurity3i is set to 1 and for rsecurity3i is
set to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 4. This value
represents 100%. psecurity3 is then calculated with the following formula:
psecurity3 =
100 · ∑2i=1 rsecurity3i
4
4.4.3.1 Test integrity in non regular intervals
Is there a mechanism or a possibility to let the firewall do some integrity checks on the rules?
4.4.3.2 List current connections
Is the firewall able to list all active connections (only in stateful mode)? Is it processable automat-
ically for exampele with the help of scripting?
4.4.3.3 Evaluation table template
Number: IV/III
System: X
Test: Test integrity in non regular intervals
Result rsecurity31
Comments
Test: List current connections
Result rsecurity32
Comments
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Table 22: Template - security - selftests
4.4.4 Guessing and fingerprinting
Rating: For each rsecurity4i is set to 2. For each rsecurity4i is set to 1 and for rsecurity4i is
set to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 8. This value
represents 100%. psecurity4 is then calculated with the following formula:
psecurity4 =
100 · ∑4i=1 rsecurity4i
8
4.4.4.1 The firewall must be able to hide its properties
Remote OS fingerprinting of the firewall itself should not be possible neither with ruleset 1 (accept
all) nor with ruleset 2 (block all). Nmap is used for testing.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 1 (see page 62)
• right1: start nmap -P0 -O -sT -T Aggressive -p 1-65535 -v -n firewall
• firewall: enable ruleset 2 (see page 62)
• right1: start nmap -P0 -O -sT -T Aggressive -p 1-65535 -v -n firewall
4.4.4.2 The firewall must use random sequence numbers
Does the firewall use (cryptographically secure) random sequence numbers to initiate connections
to the outer world? Only a very weak test is used to test the security of the sequence numbers. It
is only tested if the sequence numbers can easily be predicted (for example +1 for every packet).
Right1 is connected to the management interface.
• firewall: enable ruleset 1 (see page 62)
• right1: start nmap -P0 -O -sT -T Aggressive -p 1-65535 -v -n <firewall>
• evaluate the nmap output
4.4.4.3 The firewall must use random IP ID’s
Does the firewall use (cryptographically secure) random IP ID’s to send IP packets? The same
weak test method as in the previous statement is used.
Left1 is connected to the management interface.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 1 (see page 62)
• right1: start nmap -P0 -O -sT -T Aggressive -p 1-65535 -v -n <firewall>
• evaluate the nmap output
4.4.4.4 The firewall must be able to rewrite packets
Is the firewall able to rewrite packets to prevent active and passive operating system fingerprint-
ing? Read out of the documentation.
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Test: The firewall must hide its properties
Result rsecurity41
Comments
Test: The firewall must use random sequence numbers
Result rsecurity42
Comments
Test: The firewall must use random IP ID’s
Result rsecurity43
Comments
Test: The firewall must be able to rewrite packets
Result rsecurity44
Comments
Table 23: Template - security - fingerprinting
4.4.5 Logging and notification
Rating: For each rsecurity5i is set to 2. For each rsecurity5i is set to 1 and for rsecurity5i is
set to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 20. This value
represents 100%. psecurity5 is then calculated with the following formula:
psecurity5 =
100 · ∑10i=1 rsecurity5i
20
4.4.5.1 Log to persistant storage
Are the log files stored on a persistant storage (hard disk, flash)? Is there a log rotation mecha-
nism? Is there a technique to do log backups/transfers to other hosts? Is there a possibility for
automatic logfile processing (scripting)?
4.4.5.2 Limitations to the amount of logged information
Is the size of the logfile logically limited? Does the firewall perform log rotation when the maxi-
mum filesize is reached?
4.4.5.3 Ability to log any information which it can filter by
Is the firewall able to log all packet information and contents?
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4.4.5.4 Ability to alert in case of an emergency
Is there a mechanism to alert the admin (for example by pager, email, sms) in case of emergency?
Alert by mail? Alert by pager? Alert by snmp trap? Alert by sms?
4.4.5.5 Evaluation table template
Number: IV/V
System: X









Test: Automatic logfile processing/scripting
Result rsecurity54
Comments
Test: Maximum logfile size
Result The maximum logfile size is excluded from rating because the number
is only for information.
Comments
Test: Ability to log any information which it can filter by
Result rsecurity55
Comments
Test: Ability to alert admin in case of emergency
Result rsecurity56
Comments
Test: Ability to alert by mail
Result rsecurity57
Comments
Test: Ability to alert by pager
Result rsecurity58
Comments
Test: Ability to alert by sms
Result rsecurity59
Comments
Test: Ability to alert by snmp trap
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Result rsecurity510
Comments
Table 24: Template - security - logging
4.4.6 Default behaviour on start-up
Rating: For each rsecurity6i is set to 2. For each rsecurity6i is set to 1 and for rsecurity6i is
set to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 4. This value
represents 100%. psecurity6 is then calculated with the following formula:
psecurity6 =
100 · ∑2i=1 rsecurity6i
4
4.4.6.1 The firewall must start up in a secure state
Are there any security holes after or during emergency or breakdown of the several components?
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 2 for automatic start-up during boot
• left1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 icmp
• right1: ping -f left1
• reboot the machine by pressing reset (simulate powerfail)
The test failes if one packet passes the firewall during boot.
4.4.6.2 An empty ruleset should deny all packets
What happens when the firewall is used with an empty ruleset. The firewall gets an when all
packets are dropped with the use of an empty ruleset. When the firewall does not support an
empty ruleset, the default rule should drop all packets.
4.4.6.3 Evaluation table template
Number: IV/VI
System: X
Test: The firewall must start up in a secure state
Result rsecurity61
Comments
Test: An empty ruleset should deny all packets
Result rsecurity62
Comments
Table 25: Template - security - default config
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4.4.7 Fending known attacks
All known attacks will be simulated and evaluated. Every test will be done under low load.
Therefore scenario 1 will be used for all following tests (see chapter 3.6.1 on page 91 for details).
Rating: For each rsecurity7i is set to 2. For each rsecurity7i is set to 1 and for rsecurity7i is
set to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 50. This value
represents 100%. psecurity7 is then calculated with the following formula:
psecurity7 =
100 · ∑25i=1 rsecurity7i
50
4.4.7.1 ACK storm
For details have a look at section 1.5.1.1 on page 19 or 1.5.2.2 on page 20.
Under normal circumstances an ACK storm is handled correctly by the TCP implementations of
the involved operating systems. But it cannot be guaranteed that the clients behave correctly. The
firewall could track the connection with TCP state window tracking and filter all non-matching
packets.
A typical ACK-Storm will be simulated by using in the following way (left1 acts as client and
attacker and right1 as victim):
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable stateful firewalling at least for port 80 (see Ruleset 4 on page 62)
• right1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 port 7
• left1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 port 7
• left1: start inetd with echoserver at port 7
• right1: start telnet left1 7
• right1: get the ISN47 (= ACK Number from the first SYN/ACK packet) and the source port
for the connection (SYN packet)
• right1: start hping2 left1 -M [ISN-1] -A -s [SRC-Port] -p 7 -k (ISN-1 simulates an already used
sequence number)
this simulates a desyncronized connection (Packets with wrong Sequence Number arrive at
the victim socket. The victim sends response ACK packets with corrected ACK-Number.)
Without interaction of a firewall all packets will pass it. With TCP state window tracking all
crafted packets with the wrong sequence number should be dropped and never reach the host
right1.
4.4.7.2 Land attack
For details have a look at section 1.5.1.2 on page 19.
A Land attack will be simulated by using the program landattack (explanation is available in
chapter 3.4.2.4 on page 60. Following steps will be performed (right1 is the attacker, left1 the
victim):
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 1 (see page 62)
47ISN - Initial Sequence Number
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• right1: start tcpdump -npi eth0
• left1: start tcpdump -npi eth0
• right1: landattack left1
A good firewall should drop all these packets. If one forged packet crosses the firewall within 30
seconds the test failed!
4.4.7.3 Syn flood attack
For details have a look at section 1.5.1.3 on page 19.
A SYN flood will be simulated by using the tool synflood (see chapter 3.4.2.5 on page 61) and
blocking all incoming SYN/ACK packets at the attacking host (that the state table entry really
has to expire by timeout). SYN cookie support on client and server side will be disabled (because
it cannot be guaranteed that every TCP stack offers this feature). The same constellation as before,
left1 acts as victim and right1 as attacker.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable stateful firewalling at least for port 7 (ruleset 4, see page 62)
• right1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 port 7
• left1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 port 7
• right1: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp syncookies
• left1: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp syncookies
• left1: start inetd with echoserver at port 7
• right1: iptables -A INPUT -p tcp –tcp-flags SYN,ACK SYN,ACK -j DROP
• right1: synflooder right1 left1 7
• right2: try to connect telnet left1 7
The firewall should recognise the syn flood and drop packets or block the source host. If it does
not work by default it will be configured and the effort will be measured to reach a certain level
of protection against this attack. right1 can be monitored by netstat .R
4.4.7.4 Smurf attack
For details have a look at section 1.5.1.4 on page 19.
A smurf attack depends on the possibility to send packets to a broadcast address behind the
firewall. For this purpose all right* machines act as victims. They should all be configured to
answer ICMP48 echo packets. right1 tries to ping the broadcast address of the internal network.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 1 (see page 62)
• right1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 icmp
• left1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 icmp
• right1: ping -b [left* broadcast]
If there are a lot of answers to right1 the test failed and this functionality will be configured and
the effort will be measured and evaluated.
48ICMP - Internet Control Message Protocol
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4.4.7.5 UDP smurf attack
For details have a look at section 1.5.1.5 on page 19.
This is basically the same attack as smurf, but not commonly known and never widely exploited.
For this attack the UDP echo port on every right* will be activated.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 1 (see page 62)
• right1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 udp
• left1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 udp
• right1: echo test > /tmp/data
• right1: hping2 [left* broadcast] –udp -p 7 -E /tmp/data -d 4
• measure the answer count with tcpdump!
The firewall should also block UDP smurf attacks, if not the same actions as with smurf attacks
will be done and evaluated.
4.4.7.6 ICMP flood attack
For details have a look at section 1.5.1.6 on page 19. This is an attack mostly used to cause band-
width and traffic problems. The firewall should block or limit incoming and outgoing ICMP
messages (not only request/response) in this case to protect against this commonly used attack
form.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 1 (see page 62)
• right1: start ping -f left1
The echo request and echo response packets are to be seen as repesentatives for all ICMP types.
But there are fundamental differences to cruicial ICMP types like TTL exceed in the practical
usage - this should be mentioned in production systems.
If there are no mechanisms to limit ICMP traffic, a ruleset for this task will be generated and
evaluated.
4.4.7.7 Fragmentation attacks
For details have a look at section 1.5.1.7 on page 20 or 1.5.1.8 on page 20 or 1.5.1.9 on page 20.
This family of attacks is rather old, but it cannot be assured that there are not still some clients
protected by the firewall which are vulnerable to this form of attacks. Therefore the tool frag will
be used to generate possibly evil icmp fragments. Right1 acts again as attacker and left1 as victim.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 1 (see page 62)
• right1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 icmp
• left1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 icmp
• right1: start frag -s 1 -l 100 -a 1 right1 left1
• right1: start frag -s 10 -l 100 -a 1 right1 left1
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If in the first case (-s 1 -> 8 byte fragments) some fragments pass the firewall and reach the target
host, the test failed. The second test (-s 10 -> 80 byte fragments) is to verify, if it defragments
normal fragmented packets. The firewall should generally reassemble packets in order to do
proper filtering, prevent those attacks and unload the clients.
4.4.7.8 ARP spoofing
For details have a look at section 1.5.2.1 on page 20. ARP spoofing can only be used in an Ethernet
segment. If there are any evil internal clients, they could redirect traffic or do other nasty things
in order to compromise networked hosts or disrupt the network.
The firewall system itself should offer static ARP entries to internal routers and hosts.
To test this functionality the arpspoof utility from the dsniff package will be used against a static
ARP entry.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 1 (see page 62)
• firewall: create static ARP entry to left2
• left1: arpspoof -i eth0 -t [firewall] [left2]
• firewall: wait 60 seconds and send ICMP echo requests to left2
The firewall system could also monitor the Ethernet address and IP assignment and deny non-
matching or changing systems. But this is better done by a layer 2 switch with explicit port
management, this is no standard task for firewalls and will not be tested.
4.4.7.9 Service hijacking and DNS spoofing
For details have a look at section 1.5.2.3 on page 21 or 1.5.4.3 on page 22. There are many possi-
bilities for service hijacking. Hijacking possibilities are adapted to every service and its character-
istics. The mostly misused (in terms of hijacking/spoofing) service is doubtless theDNS Service,
because of its weak architecture.
A firewall is not able to recognise sophisticated versions of this attack but it can block some com-
mon DNS-reply attacks. Left1 acts as attacker, right1 as victim and left2 asDNS server.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable stateful firewalling at least for udp port 53 (ruleset 4, see page 62)
• right1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 udp
• left1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 udp
• right1: send forged reply packets from source port 53 to port 53 on left1 to simulate DNS
replies (hping2 left1 –udp –spoof right2 –baseport 53 –keep –destport 53 )
If some DNS replies reach right1 the test failed.
4.4.7.10 Buffer overflow
For details have a look at section 1.5.3.1 on page 21 or 1.5.3.2 on page 21. There are many pos-
sibilities for buffer overflows. Most of them are very hard to recognise. But some firewalls offer
pattern matching technologies to identify and block known attacks (deep packet inspection). For
this test general security scanners are used and the behavior of the firewall is monitored. There are
hundreds of attack vectors and everyone has its own signature - so we cannot propose a ruleset
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to block them. Bounce attacks are the same class of attacks, it cannot be prohibited by the firewall
directly, so deep packet inspection must be used to filter by content (for example commands).
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 5 (see page 63)
• right1: start nessus and scan firewall for security holes
• right1: start sara and scan firewall for security holes
4.4.7.11 WinNuke attack
For details have a look at section 1.5.3.3 on page 21. Two computers and the tool described in
section 3.4.2.6 are required for this test.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 1 (see page 62)
• left1: start tcpdump -npi eth0
• right1: start winnuke right1
If the packet with the urgent pointer = 3 is not displayed by tcpdump on the target machine (left1)
independent of the port which is attacked the firewall blocks the WinNuke attack.
4.4.7.12 IP spoofing
For details have a look at section 1.5.4.2 on page 22. IP spoofing can only be detected if addresses
from subnets are spoofed, which the firewall knows. For example right1 claims to be left2 in
communication with left1.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 1 (see page 62)
• right1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 icmp
• left1: start tcpdump -npi eth0 icmp
• right1: hping2 left1 –icmp –spoof left2
If the packets reach right1 then the test failed.
4.4.7.13 Port scanning attacks
For details have a look at section 1.5.5.1 on page 22. The firewall should perform the mentioned
actions for each ruleset to unknown attacks and log scanning attempts.
Several enhanced scanning techniques will be tested by the use of nmap . You have to prove
whether the firewall blocks all scans and drops the packets.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: enable ruleset 2 (see page 62)
• right1: start nmap -P0 -O -sT -T Aggressive -p 1-65535 -v -n left1 (TCP connect)
• right1: start nmap -P0 -O -sS -T Aggressive -p 1-65535 -v -n left1 (TCP halfopen SYN scan)
• right1: start nmap -P0 -O -sF -T Aggressive -p 1-65535 -v -n left1 (TCP FIN scan)
• right1: start nmap -P0 -O -sX -T Aggressive -p 1-65535 -v -n left1 (TCP XMAS scan)
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• right1: start nmap -P0 -O -sN -T Aggressive -p 1-65535 -v -n left1 (TCP NULL scan)
• right1: start nmap -P0 -O -sU -T Aggressive -p 1-65535 -v -n left1 (UDP scan)
4.4.7.14 Evaluation table template











Test: UDP smurf attack
Result rsecurity73
Comments
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Table 26: Template - security - known attacks (1)





Test: TCP connect scan left1
Result rsecurity710
Comments
Test: TCP connect scan firewall
Result rsecurity711
Comments
Test: TCP halfopen SYN scan left1
Result rsecurity712
Comments
Test: TCP halfopen SYN scan firewall
Result rsecurity713
Comments
Test: TCP FIN scan left1
Result rsecurity714
Comments
Test: TCP FIN scan firewall
Result rsecurity715
Comments
Test: TCP XMAS scan left1
Result rsecurity716
Comments
Test: TCP XMAS scan firewall
Result rsecurity717
Comments
Test: TCP NULL scan left1
Result rsecurity718
Comments
Test: TCP NULL scan firewall
Result rsecurity719
Comments
Test: UDP scan left1
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Result rsecurity720
Comments
Test: UDP scan firewall
Result rsecurity721
Comments
Table 27: Template - security - known attacks (2)








Test: Syn flood attack
Result rsecurity723
Comments
Table 28: Template - security - known attacks (3)





Test: Buffer overflow - nessus
Result rsecurity724
Comments
Test: Buffer overflow - sara
Result rsecurity725
Comments
Table 29: Template - security - known attacks (4)
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4.5 Usability and documentation
To assess and compare the usability of the different firewall systems in an objective way, it was
necessary to define a collection of questions which can be easily answered with yes or no. When
this ia not possible, an auxiliary comment contributes to the appreciation.
Rating: For each rusabilityi is set to 2. For each rusabilityi is set to 1 and for rusabilityi is set
to 0. The maximum number of points the firewall can reach in this discipline is 32. This value
represents 100%. pusability is then calculated with the following formula:
pusability =




Test: Easily comprehensible and transparent, no hidden options or implicit rules
Result rusability1
Comments The firewall gets a if there are no implicit rules or hidden options
and the firewall is transparent. This does not include the default be-
haviour which will be examined in section 4.4.
Test: Easily comprehensible syntax and semantics of the ruleset
Result rusability2
Comments The firewall gets a if there are instructions and examples for building
a typical ruleset.
Test: Ability to store the current ruleset
Result rusability3
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to store the loaded ruleset to a file.
Test: Log in at least one widely known format
Result rusability4
Comments The firewall gets a if it is easy to process the logged data.
Test: Log information and alarm signals directly to the OS
Result rusability5
Comments The firewall gets a if the firewall software is able to log and signal to
the operating system (for example syslogd).
Test: Send logging information and alarm signals instantly through a secure path
Result rusability6
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to send logging data over the
network to a central place. The connection has to be secure.
Test: React on specified incidents automatically
Result rusability7
Comments The firewall gets a if it is possible to define specific actions on inci-
dents reported by the firewall.
Table 30: Template - usability
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Comments The firewall gets a if there is a detailed manual available.
Test: Online help
Result rusability9
Comments The firewall gets a if there is an Online Help available.
Test: Frequently asked questions
Result rusability10
Comments The firewall gets a if there is a FAQ available.
Test: Available in various languages
Result rusability11
Comments The firewall gets a if the documentation is in at least three languages
available.
Test: Available in various medias
Result rusability12
Comments The firewall gets a if the documentation is in at least three medias
available (website, online help, manpage, etc.).
Test: Explains the dependency on other software in detail
Result rusability13
Comments The firewall gets a if the need for additional software is well docu-
mented.
Test: Discusses known bugs in detail
Result rusability14




Comments The firewall gets a if the documentation has been updated in the last
6 months.
Test: Website with additional information
Result rusability16
Comments The firewall gets a if there is a website about the firewall.
Table 31: Template - documentation
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4.6 Performance
This chapter describes, what should how be tested to prove the performance of the firewall sys-
tem.
Rating: The result of this discipline is called pperformance. Since the performance tests are divided
into three classes there are three partial results which have to be collected. The description for
calculating the partial results is desribed in the appropriate subsection. When all partial results
are collected they are summarised to pperformance by the following formula:
pperformance = 0.5 ∗ pthroughput + 0.45 ∗ platency + 0.05 ∗ pconnections
The weighting is based on subjective experience.
4.6.1 Throughput
The basic principle of this tests is, that the firewall has a minimal configuration. For several tests
some features have to be activated.
Rating the throughput: The upper limit of the throughput is given by the speed of the available
switches (see section 3.3.3.1). Therefore these values represent 100%. The results of the different
tests are compared relatively to the throughput of the switches. This is necessary to guarantee
comparability of the results of the study in the case of exchanging the hardware of the firewall.
When the result of a test depends on activation of a special feature (like NAT/PAT) the result is
compared to the maximum throughput of the firewall at the used packet size (results of test in
section 4.6.1.1). If the firewall works with activated features as fast as with deactivated features
the result should be 100%. The entire result (pthroughput) is calculated with the following formula:
pthroughput = 0.75 ∗ pthroughput1 + 0.05 ∗ pthroughput2 + 0.05 ∗ pthroughput3+
0.05 ∗ pthroughput4 + 0.05 ∗ pthroughput5 + 0.05 ∗ pthroughput6
The weighting is based on subjective experience.
4.6.1.1 Throughput depending on packet size
This test is needed to identify the maximum throughput of the firewall depending on the size of
the packets. All features of the firewall must be deactivated. It should act in routingmodewithout
NAT or PAT. All filters (stateful inspection, deep inspection, virus scanner) must be turned off.
The ruleset should be minimal. The software described in section 3.4.1.1 can be used to perform
this test. All 14 computers should generate the traffic. The packet size is increased in 100 byte
steps. For IP packets which are bigger than the MTU the tests are performed with 2000, 4000,








If a test could not be performed, the result for this test has to be marked as not available. In the
formula for such values zero is used.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 1 (see section 3.5.1.1)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 1 (see section 3.6.1)
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• for $i in (1..7) do
right$i: start throughput_test_server 5000
left$i: start throughput_test_client 5000
• for $i in (100 200 .. 1500) do
left4: start throughput_test_overseer 5001 $i 30 scenario1.conf
wait until throughput is displayed
for $i in (2000 4000 8000 16000 32000 64000) do
left4: start throughput_test_overseer 5001 $i 30 scenario1.conf



























Table 32: Template - performance - throughput depending on packet size
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4.6.1.2 Maximum throughput in routing mode with NAT/PAT
At this test, NAT and PAT must be activated on the firewall system. As test tool, the program
described in section 3.4.1.1 can be used. The throughput should be lower than the maximum
throughput and the CPU load should be higher than in normal routing mode. It is recommended




If the test could not be performed, the result for this test has to be marked as not available. In the
formula for such values zero is used.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 3 (see section 3.5.1.3)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 1 (see section 3.6.1)
• for $i in (1..7) do
right$i: start throughput_test_server 5000
left$i: start throughput_test_client 5000





Test: Maximum throughput in routing mode with NAT/PAT
Result rthroughput2
Comments
Table 33: Template - performance - throughput in routing mode with NAT/PAT
4.6.1.3 Throughput depending on size of rule set
The software described in section 3.4.1.1 can be used to perform this test. For this test ruleset
6 is used (described in section 3.5.1.6 on page 64). All 14 computers are required to guarantee








If a test could not be performed, the result for this test has to be marked as not available. In the
formula for such values zero is used.
Execution of the test:
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 1 (see section 3.6.1)
• for $i in (1..7) do
right$i: start throughput_test_server 5000
left$i: start throughput_test_client 5000
• for $i in (10 20 .. 100 200 .. 700) do
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generate and load ruleset with $i loops
left1: start throughput_test_overseer 5001 1500 30 scenario1.conf





Loops / rules Throughput (MBit/s)
10 / ≈140 rthroughput31
20 / ≈280 rthroughput32
30 / ≈420 rthroughput33
40 / ≈560 rthroughput34
50 / ≈700 rthroughput35
60 / ≈840 rthroughput36
70 / ≈980 rthroughput37
80 / ≈1120 rthroughput38
90 / ≈1260 rthroughput39
100 / ≈1400 rthroughput310
200 / ≈2800 rthroughput311
300 / ≈4200 rthroughput312
400 / ≈5600 rthroughput313
500 / ≈7000 rthroughput314
600 / ≈8400 rthroughput315
700 / ≈9800 rthroughput316
Table 34: Template - performance - throughput depending on size of ruleset
4.6.1.4 Throughput depending on activation of stateful inspection
You have to activate stateful inspection on the firewall to execute this test. All computers have to





If the test could not be performed, the result for this test has to be marked as not available. In the
formula for such values zero is used.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 4 (see section 3.5.1.4)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 1 (see section 3.6.1)
• for $i in (1..7) do
right$i: start throughput_test_server 5000
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left$i: start throughput_test_client 5000
• left4: start throughput test overseer 5001 1500 30 scenario1.conf





Test: Throughput with activated stateful inspection
Result rthroughput4
Comments
Table 35: Template - performance - throughput
4.6.1.5 Throughput depending on level of logging
This test should demonstrate that the level of logging influences the throughput negativ. The test
is executed several times. Between each test, the level of logging is increased. As test tool, the
software from section 3.4.1.1 can be used. All computers of the private and the public subnet
are used to generate traffic. When seven clients send data to the seven servers it is possible to
differ between seven sources on the firewall. The firewall logs the data according to its source.
If a small degree of logging is recommended the data of one computer is logged and if a huge
degree of logging is recommended the data of all clients is logged. The abstract ruleset 7 is able








If a test could not be performed, the result for this test has to be marked as not available. In the
formula for such values zero is used.
Execution of the test:
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 1 (see section 3.6.1)
• for $i in (1..7) do
right$i: start throughput_test_server 5000
left$i: start throughput_test_client 5000
• for $i in (0..7) do
generate and load ruleset where the data of $i computers is logged
left1: start throughput_test_overseer 5001 1500 30 scenario1.conf
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Table 36: Template - performance - throughput depending on level of logging
4.6.1.6 Throughput depending on number of simultaneous connections
At this test, two tools have to be combined. At first, a tool is recommended that creates a lot of
TCP connections and then transfers nothing. The software described in section 3.4.1.3 can man-
age this. The number of connections have to be increased in fixed steps. Each connection wastes
a small amount of memory on the firewall system. When the connection table gets fuller, the
performance may decrease. Stateful inspection has to be activated for the connection tool other-
wise the connections do not waste any memory. Between each increasing step, the throughput
has to be measured with the tool described in section 3.4.1.1. The results of the software which
measures the throughput should not be affected by the software which generates the connections.
Therefore, the connection tool does not create any traffic. It is recommended that all computers








If a test could not be performed, the result for this test has to be marked as not available. In the
formula for such values zero is used.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 1 (see section 3.5.1.4)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 1 (see section 3.6.1)
• for $i in (1..7) do
right$i: start throughput_test_server 5000
left$i: start throughput_test_client 5000
• for $i in (2000 5000 10000 20000 50000 100000 200000 350000) do
$temp = $i
$k = 1
while ($temp > 0)
if ($temp < 50000)
right$k: start connection_test_server 5050 $temp
left$k: start connection_test_client 5050 $temp
else
right$k: start connection_test_server 5050 50000
left$k: start connection_test_client 5050 50000
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$temp -= 50000
$k += 1
left1: start throughput_test_overseer 5001 1500 30 scenario1.conf















Table 37: Template - performance - throughput depending on simultaneous connections
4.6.2 Latency
The basic principle of these tests is, that the firewall has a minimal configuration. For several tests
different features have to be activated.
Rating latency: The results of the test in section 3.3.3.3 represent the best latency (100%) which
can be reachedwith the used hardware because they are absolutely independent from the firewall.
The individual results of the firewalls can not be higher than this results. This fact can be used
to calculate the quality of the firewall. The more the firewall increases the latency the worse is its
performance. When the result of a test depends on activation of a special feature (likeNAT/PAT)
the result is compared to the maximum latency of the firewall (results of test in section 4.6.2.1). If
the firewall works with activated features as fast as with deactivated features the result should be
100%. The entire result (platency) is calculated with the following formula:
platency = 0.3 ∗ platency1 + 0.1 ∗ platency2 + 0.1 ∗ platency3 + 0.1 ∗ platency4+
0.1 ∗ platency5 + 0.1 ∗ platency6 + 0.1 ∗ platency7 + 0.1 ∗ platency8
The weighting is based on subjective experience.
4.6.2.1 Best latency time through the firewall
For this test all features of the firewall have to be disabled. The firewall must be configured with
a minimal ruleset, no special filters (stateful inspection, deep inspection, virus scanners) and no
NAT or PAT. Each of this features would lower the latency time.
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A client-server architecture software is needed. The client sends packets through the firewall
to the server which echos the packets back to the client. Half of the time between sending and
receiving is approximately the latency time (less the time for sending, receiving and measuring).
The tool described in section 3.4.1.2 can be used for this test.
The packets which are sent and received must be as small as possible because small packets are
not as long on the way as larger packets. 64 byte is chosen as packet size. For this test one of the




If the test could not be performed, the result has to be marked as not available. In the formula
such values are regarded as infinite large.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 1 (see section 3.5.1.1)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 2 (see section 3.6.2)
• right1: start udpserver 192.168.100.1





Test: Best latency time
Result rlatency1
Comments
Table 38: Template - performance - best latency time
4.6.2.2 Latency time depending on activation of NAT/PAT
To execute this test, NAT and PAT has to be activated on the firewall. The achieved latency time
should be lower than in testcase 4.6.2.1 because the firewall has to rewrite the packets. As test
software, the software described in section 3.4.1.2 can be used. The packet size is set to 64 byte.





If the test could not be performed, the result has to be marked as not available. In the formula
such values are regarded as infinite large.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 3 (see section 3.5.1.3)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 2 (see section 3.6.2)
• right1: start udpserver 192.168.100.1
• left1: start udpclient 192.168.101.1
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Test: Latency in routing mode with NAT/PAT
Result rlatency2
Comments
Table 39: Template - performance - latency depending on NAT/PAT
4.6.2.3 Latency time depending on packet size
The software described in section 3.4.1.2 can perform a test with different packet sizes. The packet
size starts at 100 byte and increases in 100 byte steps until 1500 byte. After this the latency of 2000,








If the test could not be performed, the result has to be marked as not available. In the formula
such values are regarded as infinite large.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 1 (see section 3.5.1.1)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 2 (see section 3.6.2)
• right1: start udpserver 192.168.100.1
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Table 40: Template - performance - latency depending on packet size
4.6.2.4 Latency time depending on size of ruleset
As larger the ruleset is, as longer it takes until the packet delivers the firewall. For this test several
different complex rulesets are needed. The abstract ruleset 6 (see section 3.5.1.6) is able to generate
diverse complex rulesets. You can use the software described in section 3.4.1.2. The packet size
must be set to 64 byte. Between the tests, the ruleset has to be changed. One client and one server








If the test could not be performed, the result has to be marked as not available. In the formula
such values are regarded as infinite large.
Execution of the test:
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 2 (see section 3.6.2)
• for $i in (10 20 .. 100 200 .. 700) do
generate and load ruleset with $i loops
right1: start udpserver 192.168.100.1
left1: start udpclient 192.168.101.1





Loops / rules Latency (µs)
10 / ≈140 rlatency41
20 / ≈280 rlatency42
30 / ≈420 rlatency43
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40 / ≈560 rlatency44
50 / ≈700 rlatency45
60 / ≈840 rlatency46
70 / ≈980 rlatency47
80 / ≈1120 rlatency48
90 / ≈1260 rlatency49
100 / ≈1400 rlatency410
200 / ≈2800 rlatency411
300 / ≈4200 rlatency412
400 / ≈5600 rlatency413
500 / ≈7000 rlatency414
600 / ≈8400 rlatency415
700 / ≈9800 rlatency416
Table 41: Template - performance - latency depending on rule set
4.6.2.5 Latency time depending on activation of stateful inspection
With activated stateful inspection the latency time would possibly increase. The software de-
scribed in section 3.4.1.2 can be used. The latency time with activated stateful inspection can be
compared directly with the results of measurements from testcase 4.6.2.1 if the same packet size





If the test could not be performed, the result has to be marked as not available. In the formula
such values are regarded as infinite large.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 4 (see section 3.5.1.4)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 2 (see section 3.6.2)
• right1: start udpserver 192.168.100.1
• left1: start udpclient 192.168.101.1





Test: Latency at activated stateful inspection
Result rlatency5
Comments
Torsten Ho¨fler, Christian Burkert, Martin Telzer Page 137/157
Comparative firewall study Chemnitz, 1st October 2004
Table 42: Template - performance - latency depending on activation of stateful inspection
4.6.2.6 Latency time depending on level of logging
For this test, the software described in section 3.4.1.2 can be used. The packet size must be con-
stant. Between each test the detail level of logging must be increased on the firewall system. The
higher the logging level, the higher is the latency time. The highest latency time is estimated if the
firewall has to log all packets. The changes on the firewall system have to be made manually. One








If the test could not be performed, the result has to be marked as not available. In the formula
such values are regarded as infinite large.
Execution of the test:
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 2 (see section 3.6.2)
• ruleset: generate ruleset where data of zero computers is logged
• firewall: activate ruleset
• right1: start udpserver 192.168.100.1
• left1: start udpclient 192.168.101.1
• note the latency time of 64 byte large packets
• ruleset: generate ruleset where data of seven computers is logged
• firewall: activate ruleset
• right1: start udpserver 192.168.100.1
• left1: start udpclient 192.168.101.1





Test: Latency without logging
Result rlatency61
Comments
Test: Latency with activated logging
Result rlatency62
Comments
Table 43: Template - performance - latency depending on level of logging
4.6.2.7 Latency time depending on number of simultaneous connections
Each connection wastes a small amount of memory on the firewall when the firewall has activated
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stateful inspection. When the firewalls state tables are full it is possible that the entire execution
works slower.
This test is a little bit more complex test. At first a program is needed which builds a lot of
connections from the internal network to the external network. When this has happened, a second
program must test latency time. The client establishes a fixes number of connections to the server
and then makes nothing. For this job the software described in section 3.4.1.3 can be used. Here,
the latency should only be tested related to the number of simultaneous connections and should
not be affected by traffic or load on the firewall. For the second part, the software described in
section 3.4.1.2 is the best choice. The coordination of the two programs has to be done manually.
Up to 7 computers in the private subnet establish connections to 7 computers in the public subnet.








If the test could not be performed, the result has to be marked as not available. In the formula
such values are regarded as infinite large.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 4 (see section 3.5.1.4)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 1 (see section 3.6.1)
• for $i in (2000 5000 10000 20000 50000 100000 200000 350000) do
$temp = $i
$k = 1
while ($temp > 0)
if ($temp < 50000)
right$k: start connection_test_server 5050 $temp
left$k: start connection_test_client 5050 $temp
else
right$k: start connection_test_server 5050 50000
left$k: start connection_test_client 5050 50000
$temp -= 50000
$k += 1
right1: start udpserver 192.168.100.1
left1: start udpclient 192.168.101.1
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Table 44: Template - performance - latency depending on simultaneous connections
4.6.2.8 Latency time depending on load on firewall system
This test also needs a combination of two different programs. At first a software is needed, which
generates traffic and load on the firewall system. The second software measures now the latency
time. The software described in section 3.4.1.2 can be used tomeasure latency. The coordination of
the programs has to be done manually. 6 clients and 6 servers (12 computers) generate traffic with
the software described in section 3.4.1.1. One of the computers in the private subnet and one of
the computers in the public subnet make the latency test. Since the network is overloaded by the
throughput tool, the latency test has to be performed with the TCP latency tool. TCP guarantees
that the packets where transmitted sooner or later. The packets should be 64 byte large. With the




If the test could not be performed, the result has to be marked as not available. In the formula
such values are regarded as infinite large.
Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 1 (see section 3.5.1.1)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 1 (see section 3.6.1)
• for $i in (1..6) do
right$i: start throughput_test_server 5000
left$i: start throughput_test_client 5000
• right7: start throughput test overseer 5001 1500 300 scenario1b.conf
• right7: start tcpserver
• left7: start tcpclient 192.168.101.7





Test: Latency at traffic between 12 computers
Result rlatency8
Comments
Table 45: Template - performance - latency depending on load on firewall system
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4.6.3 Maximum number of connections
The number of possible connections through the firewall is limited either when NAT/PAT is
activated or if the firewall works with stateful inspection.
Rating the number of connections: The upper limit of the number of possible connections is given
by the experimental setup. Since the available 14 computers can establish 350000 connections this
350000 connections represent 100%. The result pconnections is calculated as average of the tests
with the following formula:
pconnections = 0.5 ∗ pconnections1 + 0.5 ∗ pconnections2
The weighting is based on subjective experience.
4.6.3.1 Maximum number of simultaneous connections with activated stateful inspection
The test bases on a client-server architecture software. The software described in section 3.4.1.3
can be used. Stateful inspection has to be activated on the firewall. After establishing the con-
nections the servers and the clients do nothing. It is only important that the connection wastes
memory on the firewall system. When running the software, the amount of used memory must
be observed on the firewall system. If the establishing of new connections fails and there is a lot
of free memory on the firewall system, the number of simultaneous connections is limited by the




Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 4 (see section 3.5.1.4)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 1 (see section 3.6.1)
• for $i in 1..7 do
right$i: start connection_test_server 5000 50000
left$i: start connection_test_client 5000 50000









Test: Maximum number of simultaneous connections
Result rconnection1
Comments
Table 46: Template - performance - simultaneous connections (1)
4.6.3.2 Maximum number of simultaneous connections with activated NAT/PAT
The problem with NAT/PAT is, that each connection wastes an entry in the table where the con-
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nections are stored. The number of entries is either limited by the available system memory or by
the configuration of the firewall. For the test, the same software is required as in testcase 3.4.1.3.




Execution of the test:
• firewall: activate ruleset 3 (see section 3.5.1.3)
• scenario: connect the computers according to scenario 1 (see section 3.6.1)
• for $i in 1..7 do
right$i: start connection_test_server 5000 50000
left$i: start connection_test_client 5000 50000
if ($i==7) or (50000 connections could not be established)
break





Test: Maximum number of simultaneous connections with activated NAT/PAT
Result rconnection2
Comments
Table 47: Template - performance - simultaneous connections (2)
Torsten Ho¨fler, Christian Burkert, Martin Telzer Page 142/157
Comparative firewall study Chemnitz, 1st October 2004
5 Summary and conclusion
5.1 Comparison
The following table lists the ratings for each tested group. The partial test results can be found
and compared individually in Attachement A.1.
Category System A System B System C System D System E
General requirements (pgeneral) 70.0% 70.0% 70.0% 70.0% 50.0%
Optional features (pfeatures) 65.0% 60.0% 75.0% 75.0% 55.0%
Rulesets (pruleset) 63.3% 60.9% 34.2% 33.1% 60.3%
General Aspectsr (pruleset1) 91.6% 70.8% 75.0% 75.0% 83.3%
Subnet Layer (pruleset2) 25.0% 43.5% 12.5% 12.5% 25.0%
Internet Layer(pruleset3) 74.5% 69.8% 35.8% 32.1% 71.6%
Transport Layer (pruleset4) 47.6% 52.4% 9.5% 9.5% 47.6%
Security (psecurity) 68.4% 69.8% 65.6% 58.6% 66.8%
Access to the firewall (psecurity1) 75.0% 87.5% 75.0% 75.0% 75.0%
Hardening the OS (psecurity2) 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Selftest (psecurity3) 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 25.0% 50.0%
Guessing and fingerprinting (psecurity4) 75.0% 50.0% 50.0% 12.5% 25.0%
Logging and notification (psecurity5) 60.0% 65.0% 90.0% 50.0% 85.0%
Default behaviour on start-up (psecurity6) 25.0% 25.0% 100.0% 100.0% 25.0%
Fending known attacks (psecurity7) 82.0% 84.0% 88.0% 74.0% 74.0%
Usability and documentation (pusability) 56.3% 65.6% 71.9% 68.8% 81.3%
Performance (pperformance) 41.9% 50.5% 37.9% 52.7% 44.9%
Throughput (pthroughput) 31.4% 34.9% 28.7% 39.6% 24.9%
Latency (platency) 57.9% 72.5% 52.3% 62.0% 61.0%
Number of connections (pconnections) 2.9% 9.4% 0.3% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 48: General Comparison
5.2 Pros and cons
5.2.1 Pros and cons of Packetfilter on OpenBSD
• Pros:
– very flexible filter options and ruleset handling
• Cons:
– proprietary logging mechanism
– only command line interface available
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Figure 34: Throughput depending on simultaneous connections
List 43: Pros and cons of Packetfilter on OpenBSD
5.2.2 Pros and cons of IP Tables on Linux 2.6
• Pros:
– very flexible filter options and ruleset handling
– excellent performance
– easily extensible (patch-o-matic)
• Cons:
– unstable logging mechanism
– only command line interface available
List 44: Pros and cons of IP Tables on Linux 2.6
5.2.3 Pros and cons of ISA on Windows 2003 Server
• Pros:
– easy to use
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Figure 35: Throughput depending on level of logging
– a lot of features and third party tools available
• Cons:
– unflexible filter options and ruleset handling
– only GUI interface available
– not very stable
– not useable with very large rulesets
List 45: Pros and cons of ISA on Windows 2003 Server
5.2.4 Pros and cons of SunScreen on Solaris 9
• Pros:
– excellent performance
– GUI and command line interface
• Cons:
– hardware compatibility of Solaris limited
List 46: Pros and cons of SunScreen on Solaris 9
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Figure 36: Throughput depending on packet size
5.2.5 Pros and cons of IP Filter on NetBSD
• Pros:
– can manage very large rulesets without performance loss
• Cons:
– not very stable
– very slow in overload situations
– only command line interface available
List 47: Pros and cons of IP Filter on NetBSD
5.3 Conclusion
• Throughput depending on simultaneous connections:
The measurement of throughput depending on the number of simultaneous connections,
as it is shown in figure 34, led to the result that the number of established connections the
firewall has to handle does not affect any of the tested systems. It was not possible to test
the ISA server because the system was not able to handle a large number of connections.
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Figure 37: Throughput depending on size of ruleset
• Throughput depending on level of logging:
The measurement of throughput depending on the level of logging, as it is shown in figure
35, led to the result that the level of logging does not affect the throughput on Packetfilter,
IP Tables, ISA and IP Filter. On SunScreen the throughput decreases slightly with a higher
level of logging.
• Throughput depending on packet size:
The measurement of throughput depending on the packet size, as it is shown in figure 36,
led to very different results for packet sizes larger than the MTU while all systems where
able to manage unfragmented packets without performance loss. Packetfilter, IP Tables and
IP Filter manage the throughput with decreasing performance when the systems have to
handle fragments. The ISA server is able to handle those fragments with only a small loss
of throughput performance. On SunScreen the behaviour does not have a scheme.
• Throughput depending on size of ruleset:
The measurement of throughput depending on the size of the ruleset, as it is shown in
figure 37, led to very different results. Packetfilter and IP Tables can manage the throughput
at a number of about 80 loops ruleset size without performance loss. At larger rulesets the
throughput decreases. SunScreen and IP Filter do not have any performance loss for larger
rulesets. The ISA server crashed while loading more than 100 loops. On SunScreen and ISA
server the loading of larger rulesets took several hours.
• Latency depending on simultaneous connections:
The measurement of latency depending on the number of simultaneous connections, as it is
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Figure 38: Latency depending on simultaneous connections
shown in figure 38, led to the result that the latency of all tested systems does not depend
on this number. It was not possible to test the ISA server because the system was not able
to handle a large number of connections.
• Latency depending on packet size:
The measurement of latency depending on the packet size, as it is shown in figure 39, led
to the result that all systems have a similar behaviour. The latency is proportional to the
packet size.
• Latency depending on size of ruleset:
The measurement of latency depending on the size of the ruleset, as it is shown in figure 40,
led to the following result. While Packetfilter and IP Tables have a proportional latency to
the size of the ruleset, the latency of SunScreen and IP Filter is constant. The ISA server was
not able to load more than 100 loops and crashed. On SunScreen and ISA server the loading
of larger rulesets took several hours.
The following lines are a set of some recommondations. Of course, you should always make your
own mind when you have to make a decision between several firewall systems.
• If you depend on high security, than take a look at IP Tables or Packetfilter.
• If you depend on performance and stability and you want an easy to use interface take a
look at SunScreen. The ISA server was not able to handle situation with a high load of the
network, so avoid it, if this is an often situation in your case.
• If you depend on better control of the internet and transport layer, than take a look at Pack-
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Figure 39: Latency depending on packet size
etfilter, IP Tables or IP Filter.
• If you depend on better control of the application layer, than take a look at SunScreen or ISA
server.
• If you tend to ISA server, you should prefer the final version, not the tested one.
• If you have to handle really large rulesets, than take a look at Packetfilter.
• If you do not have qualified staff to administer the firewall system, than take a look at ISA
server which is easy to handle.
• If you depend on IPv6, than take a look at Packetfilter, IP Tables and IP Filter. ISA and
SunScreen are not able to handle it yet.
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Figure 40: Latency depending on size of ruleset
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